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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented for review are:
1.

Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the Russell's

claim for breach of fiduciary duty because no fiduciary duty was owed to them or the other
trustors/borro wers.
2.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Lundberg

defendants did not owe the Russells the duty to deal with them honestly or the duty to
foreclosure the trust deed in conformity with the Utah foreclosure statute.
3.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the non-judicial

foreclosure statute, Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann., did not have the purpose of
protecting the Russells and the other trustors/borrowers and that the Lundberg defendants
did not violate this statute by charging costs that were inflated above the actual costs
incurred by Scott Lundberg as the trustee.
4.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law by ruling that Scott Lundberg was

not a party to the trust deeds in which he was the original trustee in the Russell's case and
either the original trustee or the substituted trustee for the putative class members; was not
bound by the terms of the trust deeds, including the limitation to the actual costs incurred
in the foreclosures; and he could not be held liable for breach of these contracts and breach
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of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
5.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Lundberg

defendants owed no duty to charge the foreclosure fees and only the actual costs incurred
in the foreclosures as set forth in the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, the VA, the FHA and
the private servicing agreements.
6.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the defendants did not

unjustly enrich themselves, that no restitution of the costs in excess of the actual costs
incurred by the defendants should be made, and that no restitution of the fees and costs
charged in excess of the those allowed by the regulations and private servicing contracts
should be made.
7.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Lundberg

defendants did not engage in a constructive fraud against the Russells and the other
homeowners in charging fees and costs in excess of the actual costs and fees allowed by the
trust deeds, the regulations and private servicing agreements and the Utah foreclosure
statute, Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann.
8.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law that the Lundberg defendants did

not affirmatively defraud the Russells and the other trustors/borrowers by charging fees and
costs in excess of the actual costs and fees allowed by the trust deeds, the regulations and
private servicing agreements and the Utah foreclosure statute, Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah
Code Ann.

7

9.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law that the Lundberg defendants did

not negligently misrepresent the amounts that could be legally charged for costs and fees of
foreclosure to the Russells and the other trustors/borrowers by charging fees and costs in
excess of the actual costs and fees allowed by the trust deeds, the regulations and private
servicing agreements and the Utah foreclosure statute, Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann.
10.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law that the defendants were not

engaged in a civil conspiracy.
11.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law that the defendants did not violate

the Utah Unfair Practices Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-1, et.seq.
12.

Whether the court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the claim for punitive

damages.
Each of these issues were defended by the Russells at the trial court.

See

Memorandums in Opposition to Motions of Lundberg and Backman Stewart. R. 196,220,
719, 784, 914, 956, 960 and 1004. Since each of these issues were decided on summary
judgment or on a motion to dismiss, the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the
Russells and no deference is given to the trial court's conclusions and the conclusions are
reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634,636-37
(Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL,

8

Utah Code Ann.§§ 57-1-20 to 32. (Utah non-judicial power of sale foreclosure statute.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
II.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
The plaintiffs are Utah home owners. Mr. Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates act

as the foreclosing trustee in thousands of non-judicial foreclosures each year in Utah. They
conducted three foreclosures on the plaintiffs' home. Backman Title Company and/or
Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd. provide title work and a title insurance product known
as a "trustee's sale guarantee" to the Lundberg defendants for each of the foreclosures.
Canyon Anderson is the president of Backman Title Company who negotiated Backman's
contract with the Lundberg defendants. Rodney Services Company is a corporation created
by Scott Lundberg and owned by him and his children.
The Lundberg defendants are limited by the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, the VA
and the FHA to a certain amount, typically $550.00 to $650.00, for non-judicial foreclosure
fees. Mr. Lundberg was limited to the same amount of fees by servicing agreements with
mortgage servicing companies and lenders who hire him to act as the foreclosing trustee.
In the case of the Russells, the foreclosure fees were limited by a servicing agreement to the
same amount allowed by FNMA regulations. These same regulations and servicing
agreements limited the amount that could be charged for foreclosure costs to the actual costs
incurred in each foreclosure.
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-21, et. seq., also limited the costs that could be charged by a
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trustee to the actual costs incurred. The Russells trust deed, which was a standard FNMA
trust deed, also limited the costs that could be charged to the actual costs incurred.
The Lundberg defendants used various methods to enhance the amount that they
charged in each of the thousands of foreclosures, including the three foreclosures on the
Russell's home, to an amount above those allowed by the regulations, the servicing
contracts, the trust deeds and the Utah foreclosure statute. These methods focused on
charging inflated costs which were substantially above the actual costs incurred by the
Lundberg defendants. These inflated costs included:
a.

The payment of costs for posting of notices of trustee's sales that were almost

twice the amount charged Lundberg by the persons posting the notices;
b.

The payment of inflated costs to the Intermountain Commercial Record, and

possibly other newspapers, for publishing the notices of trustee's sales and the kickback of
portions of the inflated costs to the Lundberg defendants; and
c.

The payment of premiums for title work, including the trustee sale guarantees,

with the kickback of up to 30% of these premiums to the Lundberg defendants.
III.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN TRIAL COURT.
The trial court dismissed all fifteen of the Russell's causes of action over a series of

orders.1 The orders are:

1

All fifteen causes of action applied to the Lundberg defendants, including
Rodney Services. The fifth, sixth, eighth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth causes of
action were directed towards the Backman-Stewart defendants.
10

1.

Memorandum Decision entered September 30,2002 and consequent order of

dismissal and partial summary judgment of October 30, 2002 and October 16, 2002. The
decision was based upon the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of the Lundberg
defendants and the Motion to Dismiss of the Backman-Stewart defendants. The Lundberg
Partial Summary Judgment dismissed the first (breach of fiduciary duty), second
(constructive fraud), third (breach of contract) and fourth (breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing) causes of action with prejudice. The Backman-Stewart Order of
Dismissal dismissed the fifth (restitution-mistake of fact), sixth (restitution-mistake of law)
and thirteenth (civil conspiracy) causes of action without prejudice (subsequently dismissed
with prejudice by the Order of November 4, 2003).
2.

Memorandum Decision entered August 14, 2003 and resulting summary

judgment and judgment on the pleadings of September 8, 2003 on behalf of the Lundberg
defendants and Rodney Services and summary judgment for Backman-Stewart defendants
of October 1, 2003. The Lundberg summary judgment dismissed the first four causes of
action with prejudice against Rodney Services. It also dismissed the fifth (restitutionmistake of fact), sixth (restitution-mistake of law), seventh (tortuous payment of money),
eighth (unjust enrichment), ninth (wrongful collection), tenth (liability for intended
consequences), eleventh (affirmative fraud), twelfth (negligent misrepresentation), thirteenth
(civil conspiracy), fourteenth (Utah Unfair Practices Act), and fifteenth (punitive damages)
causes of action with prejudice against the Lundberg defendants, including Rodney

11

Services.2 The Backman-Stewart summary judgment dismissed the eighth, fourteenth and
fifteenth causes of action with prejudice.
3.

Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of November 4,2003. This order dismissed

the fifth, sixth, and thirteenth causes of action against the Backman-Stewart defendants with
prejudice.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
A.

Loan on the Russell's home and foreclosures.

1.

On August 8, 1997, Mr. and Mrs. Russell entered into a mortgage on their

home. Among the documents that they executed were an Adjustable Rate Note, with a Rider
B, and a Deed of Trust, copies of which are attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A"
thereto. R.29. Para. 4, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002
(incorporating allegations of Russell's Complaint). R.124.
2.

Lundberg was appointed the original trustee under the terms of the trust deed.

Para. 5, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.124. The Loan
was sold to another lender and Lundberg continued to serve as the trustee after the sale. Id.
at para. 7.
3.

The Russells defaulted under the terms of the loan documents and foreclosure

was commenced by the Lundberg defendants as trustee under the Deed of Trust. Para. 8 &
9, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002 (incorporating

2

The order also denied the motion for class certification of the Russells.
12

allegations of Russell's Complaint). R.125.
4.

Mr. Lundberg, as the trustee under the trust deed, set the Russell's home for

sale. Para. 10, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.125.
5.

Mr. and Mrs. Russell cured the default on or about April 23, 1998 by paying

the missed payments on the mortgage, interest, and the fees and costs charged to the
beneficiary by the Lundberg defendants.

Para. 11, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary

Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.126. This payment included the following monies, as the
foreclosure fees and costs billed to the lender by the Lundberg defendants:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Trustee sale guarantee
$767.00
Recording of Substitution of Trustee
10.00
Recording of Notice of Default
12.00
Certified mail
93.00
Attorneys fees
425.00
Publication of Notice of Sale
83.07
Posting of Notice of Sale
40.00
Recording of Cancellation of Notice of Default 12.00
$1,442.07

See response to para. 12 of the Complaint in Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services.
R.51 and R.76. See also Lundberg letter of September 14, 2001. R.247.
6.

Mr. and Mrs. Russell again defaulted on their mortgage and another

foreclosure was commenced by the Lundberg defendants as trustee under the Deed of Trust.
Para. 12 & 13, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002
(incorporating allegations of Russell's Complaint). R.126.
7.
Mr. Lundberg, as the trustee under the trust deed, set the Russells' home for
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sale. Para. 14, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.126.
8.

Mr. and Mrs. Russell cured the second default on or about August 3,1999 by

paying the missed payments on the mortgage, interest, and the fees and costs charged to the
beneficiary by the Lundberg defendants. Para. 15, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary
Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.126. This payment included the following monies, as the
foreclosure fees and costs billed to the lender by the Lundberg defendants:
A.
B.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Trustee sale guarantee
$760.00
Recording of Notice of Default
10.00
Certified mail
62.00
Attorneys fees
550.00
Publication of Notice of Sale
115.00
Posting of Notice of Sale
40.00
Recording of Cancellation of Notice of Default 10.00
$1,547.00

See response to para. 14 of the Complaint in Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services.
R.52andR.76. See also Lundberg letter of September 14, 2001. R.247.
9.

Mr. and Mrs. Russell defaulted a third time under the terms of the loan

documents and another foreclosure was commenced by the Lundberg defendants as trustee
under the Deed of Trust. Para. 16 & 17, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of
Mar. 19, 2002 (incorporating allegations of Russell's Complaint). R.126 & 127.
10.

Mr. Lundberg, as the trustee under the trust deed, set the Russells' home for

sale. Para. 18, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.127.
11.

Mr. and Mrs. Russell cured the default on or about November 3, 2000 by

paying the missed payments on the mortgage, interest, and the fees and costs charged to the
14

lender by the Lundberg defendants. Para. 19, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment
of Mar. 19, 2002. R. 127. This payment included the following monies, as the foreclosure
fees and costs billed to the lender by the Lundberg defendants:
A.
B.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Trustee sale guarantee
$757.00
Recording of Notice of Default
10.00
Certified mail
43.00
Attorneys fees
550.00
Publication of Notice of Sale
143.40
Posting of Notice of Sale
65.00
Recording of Cancellation of Notice of Default 10.00
$1,578.40

See response to para. 16 of the Complaint in Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services.
R.52 and R.77. See also Lundberg letter of September 14, 2001. R.247.
B.

The foreclosure business of the Lundberg defendants and the BackmanStewart defendants.

12.

The Lundberg defendants conduct several thousand trust deed foreclosures

each year against Utah home owners such as the Russells. See Answers of Lundberg and
Rodney Services to paragraphs 18 & 30 of Complaint. R.53, 56, 78 &80.
13.

Most of the home mortgages that are foreclosed by the Lundberg defendants

fall under the rules and regulations of the Veterans Administration ("VA"), the Federal
Housing Administration ("FHA"), or under non-mortgage insured loans, called conventional
loans. See Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services to paragraph 30 of Complaint. R.56
& R.80.
14.

The VA, FHA, and lenders and loan servicers of conventional loans have

15

guidelines and regulations that limit the amount that the Lundberg defendants can charge
for trustee's fees and foreclosure costs. See Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services to
paragraph 30 of Complaint. R.56 & R.80.3 These regulations also limit the costs that can
be charged to the actual costs incurred by the trustee. Id.
15.

Lundberg handled the three foreclosures on the Russells' home pursuant to an

agreement with Aames Capital Corp. ("Aames"), the servicer of the Russells' mortgage, a
copy of which is attached to the Russell's Addendum of Facts. R.963. Lundberg also
foreclosed the Russell's home pursuant to a letter entitled "Aames Attorney Performance
Expectations" also attached to the Addendum. R.963.
16.

According to the Aames contract, Lundberg could only charge the fees and

costs in the Russells' foreclosures allowed by FNMA. Para. 2 of Agreement. R.963
17.

Attached to the Addendum is a copy of The National Mortgage Servicer's

Reference Directory, produced in discovery by Lundberg, that sets forth the fees and costs
allowed by FNMA, FHLMC, the VA and FHA. R.919. See also R.236-243. Only the
reasonable out-of-pocket costs; i.e. the actual costs incurred, are allowed by FNMA. FNMA
does not allow overhead expenses of the trustee, secretarial charges, notary fees, postage,
photocopying charges, and certified copy charges. The trustee is not allowed to charge the

3

The fees were between $450.00 and $650.00. See fee charts. Dennis A.
Jankowski, The National Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory, Vernon Enterprises
(17th Ed.), p. 1-22 & 1-23 FNMA fee chart, p. 2-14 & 2-15 FHLMC fee chart, p. 3-83
VA fee chart, p. 4-11 - 4-13, HUD (FHA) fee chart. R. 236-243.
16

borrower, such as the Russells, more to reinstate the loan than the amount allowed by
FNMA. Id. at 1-21. R.922.4
18.

Lundberg wrote a summary of Utah foreclosure law published in The National

Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory. It is attached to the Russell Addendum of Facts.
R.923. In his summary, Mr. Lundberg sets out the "allowable fees" under Utah foreclosure
law. He writes "[t]he lender may recover fees, costs and advances provided they are
reasonable, actually incurred and permitted by the documents." [Emphasis added.] Id.
R.927.
19.

Lundberg knew that he was proscribed from charging the Russells for the

artificially inflated posting and publishing costs.

See Reference Directory.

R.927.

Lundberg knew that he could charge only the actual costs of the TSG's to him. He could
not keep the kickbacks or commissions paid to him for the TSG business from the title
company. Id. The trust deed prohibited him from charging more for these costs than he
actually incurred. FNMA prohibited him from doing so. The Utah foreclosure statute
prohibited from doing so. He knew it and wrote in his summary for all other Utah
foreclosure trustees to read that they had to limit their charges to the "actual costs" incurred
and "the costs allowed by the trust deed." Id.
C,

Excess charges.
1.

4

Rodney Services Company.

FHLMC, VA, FHA have similar restrictions in foreclosures of their trust deeds.
17

20.

Rodney Services was created by Scott Lundberg in May, 2000. Maren L.

Dalton Aff. at para. 4&5. R.655. 5
21.

Mr. Lundberg owned 89% of Rodney Services and his son, Derek, owned

11%. After this lawsuit was filed, Mr. Lundberg changed the ownership of Rodney to his
children with 12.5% each and his wife, Laurie, with 25%. Dalton Aff. at para. 5. R.655.
22.

Mr. Lundberg claims to have not received any compensation from Rodney.

However, he admits to receiving the profits of Rodney. Lundberg Aff. of April 22, 2003,
at para. 7. R.663.
23.

Rodney is located in the same building as Lundberg's foreclosure firm.

Compare the addresses of Rodney and Lundberg on the invoice attached to the Opp. Mem.
to March 12,2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "C" thereto. R.772. The building
is owned by Mr. Lundberg.
2.
24.

Excess charges for posting of foreclosure notices.

Mr. Lundberg charged the Russells $40.00 for the posting of the notices in

each of the first two foreclosures. Response to interrogatory number 15, attached to the
Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "B" thereto. R.759.

5

Ms. Dalton claims to the president and managing officer of Rodney Services.
She is one of the daughters of Mr. Lundberg. Prior to the existence of Rodney, she
posted the Russells' house in the 1998 foreclosure and billed for her services in her
maiden name, Maren Lundberg. See computer printouts (p.3, line 7) of foreclosure
activity on the Russells' house produced by Lundberg in response to requests for
production, April 6, 1998 entry, which printouts are attached to plaintiffs Opp. Mem. to
March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "A" thereto. R.736.
18

25.

Both of these foreclosures were completed before Rodney was formed. Dalton

Aff. para. 13 & 16. R.657 & 658.
26.

Rodney charged the Russells $65.00 to post the notices in the third foreclosure.

Response to interrogatory number 15, attached to the Opp. Mem. to March 12,2003 Motion
of Rodney Services as Exhibit "B" thereto. R.759. See also Rodney invoice # 501 attached
to the Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "C" thereto.
R.772.
27.

Rodney paid Mr. Lundberg's wife, Laurie Lundberg, $35.00 to post the

foreclosures. See Rodney statement, history of payment and Check #1150, attached to the
Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "D" thereto. R.774
& 775. Thus, Rodney was charging $30.00 more to post houses than it was paying the
people who posted them. This overcharge was a practice used by Rodney in all foreclosures.
Dalton Aff. para. 7. R.656. Prior to the formation of Rodney, Lundberg was charging $5.00
to $10.00 more than he was paying the persons posting the homes on which he was
foreclosing. See charges to the Russells for the first two foreclosures, above.
28.

Lundberg was paid up to $550.00 as his fee for each foreclosure on the

Russell's home. See charges to the Russells in para. 5, 8 and 11, above. He was paid up to
$650.00 as his fee for handling other foreclosures. See Reference Directory, R.236-243.
The $550.00 charged on the Russell's foreclosures was the maximum amount allowed by
the Aames servicing agreement. See para. 16 & 17, above. Managing the posting of
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foreclosures was part of the services for which Mr. Lundberg was paid his trustee's fee.
Prior to the creation of Rodney, Mr. Lundberg's employees performed the simple task of
sending a copy of the foreclosure notice to the person posting the notice as part of their work
for which Lundberg was paid the $550.00 - $650.00. After Rodney was formed, Lundberg's
employees took the same step of sending the notice, but it was sent to Rodney.
29.

Rodney was set up as a "middle man." It was set up to enable Lundberg to

charge for these services which should have been included in his trustee's fee. He formed
Rodney to hid the fact that $30.00 of the $65.00 charged by Rodney was in excess of the
actual costs of posting. This overcharge went into his pocket as profit, or rent paid to him
as Rodney's landlord, or went into the pockets of his wife and children as the owners of
Rodney. The $30.00 added up to a substantial amount given the fact that Mr. Lundberg
conducted thousands of Utah foreclosures each year.
3.
30.

Excess charges for publication costs.

Mr. Lundberg charged the Russells $83.07 and $115,00 for publishing the

notices in each of the first two foreclosures. Response to interrogatory number 15, attached
to the Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "B" thereto.
R.758. Both of these foreclosures were completed before Rodney was formed. Dalton Aff.
para. 13 & 16. R.657 & 658.
31.

Rodney charged the Russells $143.00 to publish the notices in the third

foreclosure. Response to interrogatory number 15, attached to the Opp. Mem. to March 12,
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2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "B" thereto. R. 758.
32.

The amount of the publishing was increased by about $30.00 in the third

foreclosure. This $30.00 was an administrative fee charged by Rodney. Dalton Aff. para.
8. R.656. Rodney performed no service to earn the $30.00 other than the faxing of the
notice to the newspaper. Prior to the formation of Rodney, Lundberg's employees sent a
copy of the foreclosure notice to the newspaper for publication as part of the foreclosure
work for which Lundberg was paid his fee of $550.00 to $650.00. Again, Rodney was
acting as a middle man to artificially inflate the publication costs by $30.00, which $30.00
went into the back pocket of Lundberg, or his family. Rodney performed no service other
than the same minimal service for which Lundberg was already paid $550.00 to $650.00 to
perform. This $30.00 per foreclosure added up to a substantial amount with the thousands
of foreclosures handled by Lundberg each year.
33.

Rodney operated for a period charging this administrative fee for publishing.

Dalton Aff. para. 9. R.656. Rodney, thereafter, negotiated a $30.00 kickback from the
Intermountain Commercial Record whereby the Record would publish Lundberg's notices
at the higher rate of $143.00 and then pay a "commission" back to Rodney of $30.00. Id.
Attached to the Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "D"
thereto, R.773, is a list of 45 $30.00 kickbacks, totaling $1,350.00, paid to Rodney by the
Intermountain Commercial Record for a seven day period in October 2000. (The $30.00
kickback marked "521" was for the publication of one of the Russells' notices. This number
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comports with the same number identifying the other charges made by Rodney to the
Russells and is the reason that Rodney circled the number "521" on the exhibit.)
4.
34.

Trustee Sale Guarantee fees,

The Backman-Stewart defendants are in the title insurance business and

provide title services to the Lundberg defendants in connection with their foreclosures. See
response to para. 19 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.53.
35.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19, et. seq. provides that the trustee conducting the

foreclosure give notice to individuals that have recorded requests for notice. Prior to the
middle 90fs, it was the custom of trustees to order foreclosure reports from title companies
such as the Backman-Stewart defendants that identified the persons to whom notice had to
be given under the Utah Code. These foreclosure reports typically cost between $200.00 to
$300.00. See response to para. 20 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54.
36.

Occasionally, a title company would fail to identify someone to whom notice

was required. If the person who was missed challenged the foreclosure, title to the property
would be tainted and the person who purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, would
be damaged. See response to para. 21 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54.
37.

In the middle 90's, the large quasi-government entities that would package,

secure and sell large pools of mortgages to investors, FNMA and FHLMC, required the title
insurance industry to come up with a product that would insure against the failure to
properly identify the persons to whom notice should be sent. See response to para. 22 of
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Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54.
38.

In response, the title insurance industry produced an insurance product,

universally called "the Trustee's Sale Guarantee" ("TSG"). Like the foreclosure reports, the
TSG identified all of the persons to whom notice of the trustee's foreclosure had to be sent
under state law, and under Federal law when Federal tax liens were recorded against the
property. However, the TSG had an insurance element, in that the title insurer, for whom
the title company was an agent, insured that the people identified in the TSG were the
correct persons that needed to receive notice. If the title company missed someone who
should have received notice, the title insurer would pay the loss. See response to para. 23
of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54.
39.

The title company and the title insurer charged a premium for this insurance.

The premium was calculated as a percent of the principal of the loan that was being
foreclosed.

The premium was typically $250.00 to $300.00 more than the cost of

foreclosure reports. In the case of the Russells, they were charged between $757.00 and
$767.00 for the TSGs. See response to para. 24 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54.
40.

The amount of the TSG premium is determined by the title insurer. The agent

for the insurer who issues the TSG charges according to the rates determined by the insurer.
Because of the competitive nature of the title industry, the premiums charged for TSGs by
competing insurers are within a couple of dollars of each other. Once the premium is
determined by the insurer, the premium is filed with the Utah State Insurance Department.
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All that the insurer needs to do to raise or lower the premium is file a new premium with the
Department. The Utah Insurance Commission does not determine the amount that the title
company can charge. See response to para. 24 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54.
41.

Prior to late 2000 or early 2001, Lundberg obtained a 3 0% limited partnership

interest in Backman-Stewart. See para. 16 of Lundberg's facts in Mem. in Spt. of his April
22, 2003 Motion. R.600.
42.

Lundberg was paid 30% of the premiums for the TSG's referred to Backman-

Stewart. Lundberg's check to Backman-Stewart would be sent as payment for a number of
the TSG's and a return check was immediately cut from Backman-Stewart to Lundberg for
30% of the these specific trustee sale guarantees. (The discovery necessary to set this fact
was disputed and summaryjudgment was granted over the Russell's Rule 56(f) motion and
objection.)
43.

Lundberg admits that he received commissions (money, kickbacks) from

Backman-Stewart in recognition of the large volume of TSG business that he referred to
Backman-Stewart. See para. 18 & 19 of Lundberg's facts in Mem. in Spt. of his April 22,
2003 Motion. R.600 & 601.
44.

In August, 2000, Lundberg and Canyon Anderson, the President of Backman-

Stewart became worried about the direct splitting of premiums with Lundberg because of
an investigation that was being conducted by the Utah Insurance Commission.

See

Lundberg letter to Canyon Anderson, dated August 8, 2000, concerning "Commission
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income" attached to Lundberg's responses to requests for production. R. 770(a)-771. See
also Lundberg "Commission Contract" with Backman-Stewart. R. 768-69. Lundberg and
Backman-Stewart came up with a plan by which Backman-Stewart would continue to pay
commissions to Lundberg because of his referral of TSG business, but Lundberg would also
take an ownership interest in Backman-Stewart.6
45.

In this letter and contract, Lundberg recognized that it was illegal to split the

TSG premiums with him unless he "contributes to the search and examination of the title or
other services connected with it." Id. He attempted to meet this test by stating in the letter
that he would sign the trustee sale guarantees and perform "title clearing work." Id.
46.

Mr. Lundberg, however, does not sign the TSG's. For example, the TSG's on

each of the Russell's foreclosures were all prepared, reviewed and issued by employees of
Backman-Stewart and then delivered to Lundberg. Lundberg performed no work on the
TSG's. Nor did he contribute to the search and examination of the title. See TSG's attached

6

The Russells do not know the amount of "commissions" that were paid to
Lundberg by Backman-Stewart. He refused to reveal this amount in discovery and
summary judgment was granted over the Russell's Rule 56(f) motion and objection. The
"commissions" were substantial. Mr. Lundberg identified in discovery that one month
after this suit was filed, he stopped the payment of commissions to him for the TSG's,
although he continued to place all of his TSG work with Backman-Stewart. To keep his
income stream coming from Backman-Stewart, he started collecting $15,000 per month
as "attorney's fees" for "title curative" work, although such work was actually
performed for the lenders, not the title company. (See para. 47, below and R. 748.) Mr.
Lundberg also refused to provide a history of attorney work performed or his billing
records. He also started taking a salary of $4,000.00 per month at this time as an officer
of Backman-Stewart. See answer to Interrogatory No. 4. R.748.
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to Russell's Addendum of Facts, R.928-955. Not one of them were signed by Lundberg.
They were all signed by representatives of the title company.7
47.

Mr. Lundberg 's title clearing work was performed for the lenders who paid

him directly to do the work. He never performed title clearing work for Backman-Stewart.
Title clearing work is required by lenders who send loans to Lundberg for foreclosure, not
the title company. It has no benefit for the title company. This work consists of Lundberg's
employees calling on other loans that are still of record even though they were paid off by
the lender's loan. The Aames letter agreement concerning "Aames Attorney Performance
Expectations" with Lundberg states that Lundberg is working for Aames, the lender, for title
clearing. R.963. The letter identifies the "partnership" between Lundberg and Aames and
the need "to protect Aames interest" and to "advise Aames of any issue that could cause a
delay or jeopardize Aames' lien position." Id. The letter states that Aames has a "swat
team" set up to work with its attorneys who handle foreclosures, such as Lundberg, to clear
up any title problems that could "jeopardize Aames' lien position." Id. This is "title
clearing." It is performed for the lender, not the title company.
5.

48.

Payment of excess charges by the Russells and the other Utah
borrowers.

Lundberg charged the lender the amount of the posting and publication costs

7

Even if Mr. Lundberg would have signed the TSG's, it would not overcome the
requirement of the Utah Insurance Code on splitting title commissions, that such a split
can be made only with a person who actually performs the title search. Utah Code Ann.§
31A-23-404. Lundberg, admittedly, never searched any titles.
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for each of the Russell's foreclosures. Lundberg Aff. of March 18,2002, para. 21. R.148.
Lundberg also charged the lender the amount of the costs for the title work and the trustee
sales' guarantees. Id. These charges were the actual amounts paid by Lundberg to
Backman-Stewart, Rodney and the Commercial Record. They were not reduced by the
amount of the kickbacks and commissions paid by the title company and the Intermountain
Commercial Record to Lundberg and Rodney. The charges for posting was, likewise, not
reduced by the $30.00 paid to Rodney in excess of the amount paid to the person actually
posting the notices. See Lundberg's letter to the Russells' counsel of September 14, 2001,
which identifies the amount charged to the Russells to bring their loan current and stop each
of the three foreclosures. R. 776. The amount set forth in the letter as the costs of posting
and publication is the full amount of these costs without reduction for the kickbacks,
commissions or overcharges.
49.

Lundberg also sent a letter to the Russells in each foreclosure outlining the

amount that needed to be paid in order to stop the foreclosures, which letter included all of
his costs, including the inflated costs. Lundberg Aff., para. 24,31, and 39. R. 666,668 and
670. See also Lundberg's letter to Russells' counsel of September 14, 2001, breaking out
the costs. R. 776.
50.

The Russells were required to pay these inflated costs and were also required

to pay the full amount of the trustee's fee allowed by the agency regulations and the Aames
servicing contract before the foreclosures would be terminated and the trust deeds
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"reinstated." R. 776. The other Utah borrowers had to pay these inflated costs to stop Mr.
Lundberg's foreclosures.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As the trustee under the terms of the trust deed, Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells a
number of duties. These duties included the duty to act honestly towards them in the
foreclosures, the duty to foreclose in conformity with the Utah foreclosure statute and charge
only the actual costs of foreclosure under the statute. The duties included a fiduciary duty
because of the existence of a fiduciary relationship with the Russells at the time of the
foreclosure. Mr. Lundberg, as the trustee under the trust deed, also owed the Russells the
duties within the contract. Finally, he owed the Russells the duty to not charge more in costs
than the actual costs allowed by the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, VA, FHA and the
servicing agreements he had with the servicers and lenders.
Fact issues certainly existed that established these duties. The trial court took the
right to determine these fact issues from the jury.
To the extent that the Court determines that a contractual duty did not exist, the
alternative claim for unjust enrichment should be maintained.
By engaging in the kickbacks, Lundberg, Backman-Stewart, the Commercial Record,
Rodney and their principals established a monopoly for the foreclosure services work. This
monopoly had at its heart the kickbacks that locked out other title companies and
newspapers. This violated the Utah Unfair Practices Act.
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Mr. Lundberg clearly knew that he could only charge the costs that he actually
incurred in the foreclosures. He is the expert on foreclosures in Utah. He wrote the section
on Utah foreclosure law in the desk book used by other trustees. In his writing, he instructed
other trustees to limit their costs to those actually incurred. Nevertheless, he formed a
dummy corporation to artificially inflate the foreclosure costs through nonexistent
"administrative costs." He took kickbacks from providers of title work and newspapers for
their services. The net result was that the costs that borrowers had to pay to stop the
foreclosures on their homes were much more than the actual costs incurred by Mr.
Lundberg. The jury should be able to consider punitive damages against Mr. Lundberg and
the other defendants.
ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred when it determined that Mr. Lundberg owed no duty to
the Russells as the foreclosing trustee.
Mr. Lundberg argued to the trial court that he, as a trustee, owed no duty to the

trustors, the Russells, by statute, contract, or at common law absent some significant
personal relationship that arose with the Russells at the time the trust deed was signed. The
trial court agreed with this argument and dismissed the various claims of the Russells.
The Russells contend that Mr. Lundberg owed them the high duty of a fiduciary
under Utah common law. The Russells further contend that Mr. Lundberg at least owed
them the duty to foreclosure their home consistent with the Utah foreclosure statute and
consistent with the contractual requirements of the trust deed. Mr. Lundberg certainly owed
29

the Russells the duty to not defraud them.
A*

Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the high duty of a fiduciary.

The duty owed by a foreclosing trustee to the trustors of a trust deed has been
considered in a number of cases before Utah's appellate courts. In Blodgett v. Martschu 590
P.2d 298, 301-03 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court determined that in the typical trust
deed transaction there were two opportunities for a fiduciary duty to arise. The first
opportunity was when the trust deed was signed. The second was at the time the trust deed
was foreclosed.
The Utah Supreme Court held that "the duty of the trustee under the trust deed was
greater than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default
provision of the trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance
with a high punctilio of honor." Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d at 302. The Court reasoned
that the trustee owed the trustor this fiduciary duty because of the lack of court oversight in
the non-judicial foreclosure process and the consequent prospect and ease of unfair dealing
and overreaching by the trustee. Id.
The unfair dealing and overreaching of a foreclosing trustee for the benefit of his own
pocket is what this case is all about. Mr. Lundberg was not happy with the $450 to $650 in
trustee's fees to which he was limited by his contract with the lender/servicer, Aames.8 He

8

The Aames contract adopted the FNMA limitation of $550 for fees and the
requirement of only charging for actual costs incurred by the trustee. The other agencies
for whom Mr. Lundberg foreclosed, FHLMC, the VA, and the FHA have similar
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wanted more. He formed a dummy corporation, owned by himself and his family, to charge
more for publication of the foreclosure notices and posting of the notices than was actually
charged by the people posting and publishing the notices. The dummy corporation tried to
hide the excess charges as "administrative fees." However, the only service provided by the
dummy corporation to earn the administrative fee was to fax a copy of the foreclosure notice
to the newspaper who published the notice and to the person who posted the notice. This
simple act of faxing the notice was part of the foreclosure process for which Mr. Lundberg
was paid $450.00 to $650.00 in fees.
Mr. Lundberg also took a $30 kickback from the Intermountain Commercial Record
on each notice sent to the Record for publication. He called them "commissions." Mr.
Lundberg also took "commissions" from Backman-Stewart for the "large level of business
sent to this title company. The business that he provided was the TSG's that Lundberg was
required to obtain by the lenders, which TSG's cost the Russells about $757.00 in each
foreclosure.
The inflated foreclosure costs that Mr. Lundberg collected were substantial. He
admits to performing thousands of foreclosures each year on the homes of Utah residents.
He used the same practices in all of the foreclosures. The $60 in excess costs for publishing
and posting on thousands of foreclosures each year would add up to hundreds of thousands

limitations.
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of dollars.9
Mr. Lundberg never revealed how much in "commissions" that he received from
Backman-Stewart for the TSG's. But, we know that one month after this suit was filed, he
and Mr. Canyon Anderson of Backman-Stewart changed his compensation from
commissions to $15,000 per month in attorney's fees (that he never kept track of by
assignment or services performed) and $4,000 per month as an officer and director of
Backman-Stewart. See para. 44, above.
The Utah Supreme Court refined its position taken in Blodgett on a trustee's fiduciary
duty in First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). The
Court held that in cases: 1) were the trustor reposes trust or confidence in the trustee and
relies on the trustee's guidance; 2) where the trustee could exercise extraordinary influence
over the trustor; or 3) where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor, the
trustee would have a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the trustor. Id. at 1256. l0
The Russells were faced with the same dilemma with which every borrower is faced
who must stop foreclosure of their home. They had to pay the amount of foreclosure costs
demanded by the trustee. They had no control over the amount of these costs. They had no
knowledge of the actual amount of the costs. They had no knowledge that Lundberg had
9

The summary of "commissions" paid to Mr. Lundberg for a short seven day
period from the Commercial Record alone totaled $1,350. See fact para. 33.
10

This Court followed the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of the foreclosing
trustee's fiduciary duty in Five F v. Heritage Savings Bank. 81 P.3d 105, 108 (Ut. App.
2003).
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artificially inflated the costs. They simply had to pay the costs in order to terminate the
foreclosure and save their home.
Mr. Lundberg sent the initial notice of default for each foreclosure from his office.
It had his address on it and identified him as the foreclosing trustee. He sent the notice of
sale from his office. It listed him as the foreclosing trustee. When it came time to cure the
default, the Russells called his office to determine what they had to pay. They were given
the figure by Mr. Lundberg's assistant. The Russells relied on this figure as the amount
honestly owed under Utah law to cure the default and stop the foreclosures.
Mr. Lundberg clearly stood in a dominant position to the Russells. He exercised
extraordinary influence over them as he held the future ownership of their home in his
hands. The Russells relied on his guidance as to the amount of costs that they had to legally
pay in order to stop the foreclosures. The Banberry Crossing test of fiduciary duty was met.
Mr. Lundberg argued that he could not be held to a fiduciary duty unless he had a
personal relationship with the Russells at the time the trust deeds were signed. The trial
court agreed. However, this is not the test of fiduciary duty set out in Banberry, which test
can be met from the facts that arise during foreclosure. It is also a dangerous position for
the courts of the state of Utah to take from a public policy point of view. In today's society,
trustees are chosen by the lenders. Trustors have no input about the person who is to act as
the trustee. The trustor needs the protection of a fiduciary to protect him or her from
dishonest activities, such as the pocketing of excess moneys for costs not actually incurred
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by the trustee.
The Utah Legislature contemplated that the trustee would be a person who would act
honestly towards the trustor. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-21 permits only persons or entities with
credentials of trustworthiness, such as attorneys, to act as trustees. The Utah Supreme Court
believed that the reason for this requirement was the high level of trust reposed in the trustee
by the trustor and the beneficiary. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d at 302.
B.

Mr, Lundberg owed the Russells the lesser duty of foreclosing their home
in a manner consistent with the Utah foreclosure statute.

The Utah Supreme Court stated in Banberry Crossing that "the trustee's duty to the
beneficiary does not imply that the trustee may ignore the trustor's rights and interests." First
Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d at 1256. This Court held in FiveF
that this meant that the trustee owed the trustor the duty to be honest and to at least follow
the Utah foreclosure statute during the foreclosure even if the trustor could not establish the
higher duty of a fiduciary. Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d at 108.1?
Mr. Lundberg was not honest with the Russells. Further, he did not follow the Utah
foreclosure statute when he charged inflated costs that were well above his actual costs
incurred in the foreclosures.

n

The duty of honesty and fairness is supported in other areas of commercial and
real property law. In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court held that a real estate agent hired by the seller may not owe a fiduciary
duty to the buyer, but he owed the buyer a duty of "honesty, integrity, truthfulness,
reputation, and competency."
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The Utah Code contains numerous protections for trustors/borrowers.12

The

protections are designed to protect the trustor's right to due process before the taking of his
or her real property. The protections are also designed to protect the trustor from excess
foreclosure fees and costs. To meet these objectives, the protections include a detailed
method of giving notice to the trustor, to any other party who recorded a request for notice
with the County Recorder, and to the general public. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-24, 25 & 26.
The notice provisions are designed to develop interest in the upcoming sale in order to
obtain the highest price possible and decrease the risk of a deficiency against the trustor.
The trustor's protections also include the right to a public auction, the right of the
trustor to direct the order by which the trust property should be sold if it consists of several
lots, the duty of the trustee to obtain irrevocable offers, and the right to payment of any
monies in excess of the amount due the lender and junior lienholders. Utah Code Ann. § 571-27, 28 & 29.

l2

The Utah courts have recognized that the trust deed foreclosure sections of the
Utah Code were designed to protect the trustor/borrower. Concepts, Inc. v. First Security
Realty Services. Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1987), "[t]he statutes governing
foreclosure sales under trust deeds protected the interests of plaintiffs [trustors] up to the
moment that the property was sold and a trustee's deed issued."; Jones v. Johnson. 761
P.2d 37, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), "[t]he detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's
sale of real property under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 to 34 (1986) are intended to
protect the debtor/trustor"; Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978), the duty
of the trustee is to act on behalf of the trustors with diligence and good faith consistent
with his primary obligation to assure the payment of the secured debt; and First Security
Bank v. Felger. 658 F.Supp. 175, 183 (D.Utah 1987), the purpose of the trust deed
foreclosure statute is to protect the borrower.
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Of paramount importance to the trustor/borrower is the protection afforded in Utah
Code Ann. §57-1 -29 that the trustee shall pay from the sale's proceeds his fees and costs that
are actually incurred in the foreclosure, but not to exceed the fees and costs allowed by the
trust deed. Mr. Lundberg's fees are set by the VA, FHA, FNMA, FHLMC and servicing
agreements at between $450.00 and $650.00. In the Russell's case Mr. Lundberg's fees
were set as the highest amount allowed by FNMA pursuant to the Aames contract. He
illegally increased the money that he was paid by charging costs that were artificially inflated
above the actual costs incurred by him.
Another critical protection granted to the trustor/borrower is the right to cure the
default of the trust deed, stop the foreclosure and save his or her home by paying the amount
of the default, plus "costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the
obligation or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred .. ." Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1).13 The Russells cured each of their three foreclosures. Mr.

13

Mr. Lundberg argued to the trial court that Section 57-1-31, requiring the trustor
to pay only the amount of fees, costs and expenses that are actually incurred is evidence
that he has no statutory duty to be honest and fair with the trustor because the statute says
that the trustor shall pay the beneficiary the amount of the obligation plus all such fees,
costs and expenses actually incurred. Opp. Mem. at 14. Mr. Lundberg ignores the fact
that he bills the lender for his inflated costs. The lender then tells the borrower, such as
the Russells, to pay these costs in order to stop the foreclosure. In the Russell's case, Mr.
Lundberg also sent a letter to them in each foreclosure outlining the amount that needed
to be paid in order to terminate the foreclosure. The fact that the trustor pays Lundberg's
fees and inflated costs to the beneficiary rather than to Mr. Lundberg is a distinction
without meaning. What is important is the fact that Lundberg creates the pumped-up fees
and they are paid by the lender if the borrower does not save the home from foreclosure
or they are paid by the borrower if the home is saved, as in the Russells' case.
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Lundberg, however, did not charge them the costs actually incurred in the foreclosures. He
charged them the pumped up costs that had hidden commissions (kickbacks) and
administrative costs for his dummy corporation, which administrative costs were incurred
for the very same work for which he was paid the $550.00 in fees for handling each
foreclosure.
Finally, the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be obtained against a trustor
is limited to "the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of
the property as of the date of the sale." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. [Emphasis added.] This
provision presumes that the costs, expenses and fees of the trustee are not illegally inflated.
If they are illegally inflated then the purpose of this section, to limit the amount of a
deficiency, is defeated.
C.

Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to not defraud them.

In Banberry Crossing, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[ojbviously, a trust deed
trustee may not scheme to defraud a trustor." First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry
Crossing, 780 P.2d at 1256. Fraud can be committed by an affirmative misrepresentation
or by an omission of a material fact where there is a duty to speak. Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369,1373 (Utah 1980). Lundberg committed both types of fraud. He
sent a letter to the Russells in each foreclosure with the amount necessary to cure the default.
This amount included his illegally inflated costs. He also told the lender the amount
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necessary to cure the default, which included his excessive costs. The lender then, relying
on Lundberg's statements, told the Russells to pay the pumped-up costs in order to stop the
foreclosures.
Lundberg also owed the Russells the duty to deal fairly with them. First Security
Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d at 1256. He owed them the duty to charge
only his actual costs under the Utah foreclosure statute, the trust deed, and the regulations
of FNMA as adopted by the Aames servicing contract. He hid the fact that he had
artificially jacked up his costs through kick-backs and administrative fees to a dummy
corporation; that the costs were not his actual out of pocket costs. This constituted fraud by
non-disclosure.14
D.

Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to not negligently misrepresent
the amount of his actual costs.

The trial court dismissed the Russells' claim for negligent misrepresentation based

14

To establish fraud, the Russells must prove by clear and convincing evidence: 1)
a representation (or non-disclosure with a duty to disclose); 2) concerning a material fact;
3) which was false; 4) which Lundberg knew to be false or was made recklessly knowing
that the Russells had insufficient knowledge about the representation; 5) for the purpose
of inducing the Russells to act thereon; 6) that was reasonably relied on by the Russells;
7) in ignorance of its truth; 8) to their injury. Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641
P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982). Mr. Lundberg represented the costs to be something other
than his actual costs or he failed to reveal that the costs were not his actual costs as
required by the trust deed, Utah law, and the Aames contract. He knew of the
misrepresentation, or should have realized that the Russells would have no idea about his
actual costs. He made the representation, or omission, for the purpose of inducing the
Russells to pay the inflated costs. The Russells relied on the representation, or omission,
by paying the inflated costs and their reliance was reasonable.
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upon the same reason that it dismissed the fraud claim; that no duty was owed by Mr.
Lundberg to the Russells to accurately represent the amount of his actual costs. As argued
above, Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to accurately represent his actual costs and
collect no more costs than those he actually incurred. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land
Title Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983). He breached this duty, either intentionally (fraud) or
negligently (negligent misrepresentation).
E.

Mr, Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to abide by the terms of the
trust deed in foreclosing their home.

The Russell trust deed was a uniform FNMA/FHLMC trust deed.15 Mr. Lundberg
is a party to the trust deed. He was the original trustee. He gave permission to the lender to
use him as the trustee. Lundberg affidavit. R. 173 & 74. He was bound by its terms.16
Mr. Lundberg argued that he was not a party to this contract. The trial court agreed
with him. This position is contrary to his own act of agreeing to act as the trustee, agreeing
to be named as such in the trust deed, and agreeing to abide by the foreclosure requirements
l5

The vast majority of trust deeds used in standard consumer first mortgages are
such uniform trust deeds because the loans are pooled and packaged by large securities
firms, such as Merrill Lynch, and sold as mortgaged backed securities in the securities
markets. To assure the investors who purchase the securities that their rights are
consistent among the numerous trust deeds that make up the pools, both FNMA and
FHLMC require that standard trust deeds be used.
16

In the cases where he is not the original trustee, Mr. Lundberg agrees to be a
substituted trustee and a Substitution of Trustee is recorded pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-22. He is then bound to the obligations of the trustee under the trust deed.
Indeed, paragraph 23 of the trust deed states that the substituted trustee shall "succeed to
all [the prior trustee's] title, estate, rights, powers and duties." R.39.
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in the body of the trust deed.17 This Court considered whether a trustee was a party to a
contract by acting as the trustee of a trust deed in Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank. 81 P.3d
at 109. This Court held that so long as the trustee abided by his contractual duties and the
requirements of the Utah foreclosure statute, he could not be held liable for breaching his
contractual duties. Further, this Court ruled that a claim against the trustee for unjust
enrichment was improper because the trustor had an action for breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the trustee failed to follow the Utah
foreclosure statute.
Both the lender for the Russells and Mr. Lundberg claimed the benefit of the default
provisions of the contract when they foreclosed on the Russells. Yet, they denied the
Russells the protections of the trust deed. These protections included the duty to pay the
actual foreclosure costs if they reinstate the trust deed by curing the default, para. 18; the
duty, at the trustee's sale, to pay the actual costs of the trustee, para. 21; and the duty of the
trustor to reimburse the trustee for his fees "permitted by applicable law" and his actual
costs, para. 35. The trust deed does not authorize the trustee to inflate his costs above the
actual costs incurred by him. Mr. Lundberg, thereby, breached the terms of the trust deed.
F.

Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to abide by the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

17

The trustee is granted certain rights and incurs certain duties under various
provisions of paragraphs 21 to 35 of the trust deed. R. 39 & 40. The trust deed clearly
treats him as a party to the contract.
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Mr. Lundberg argued and the trial court agreed that he was not a party to a contract
by his position as the trustee under the trust deed. They concluded that the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing did not, therefore, apply to him.
Every contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Brehanv v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). This Court held that a trust deed, as
a contract, was subject to such a covenant. Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d at
109. This Court also held that, so long as the trustee forecloses in conformity with the
contractual requirements of the trust deed and the Utah foreclosure statute, there can be no
breach of the implied covenant. However, Mr. Lundberg did not foreclose in conformity
with the requirements of the Russells' trust deed or the Utah foreclosure statute. He violated
the protections of both in order to collect more money, as illegally inflated costs, than
allowed by the statute or by the contract. He, thereby, violated the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
G.

Mr. Lundberg owed a duty to not collect more than the $450 to $550 in
fees and his actual costs for each foreclosure under the Aames servicing
contract and the regulations of FNMA.

Mr. Lundberg's fees were set by VA, FHA, FNMA and FHLMC at $450.00 to
$550.00 per foreclosure. Only costs actually incurred were allowed. See fee charts. Dennis
A. Jankowski, The National Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory, Vernon Enterprises
(17th Ed.), p. 1-22 & 1-23 FNMA fee chart, p. 2-14 & 2-15 FHLMC fee chart, p. 3-83 VA
fee chart, p. 4-11 - 4-13, HUD (FHA) fee chart. R. 236-243. Lenders and servicing
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companies also restricted his fees and his costs to the actual costs. In the Russells' situation,
Lundberg was limited to the fees and costs allowed by FNMA pursuant to the contract
between Aames, the lender/servicer, and Lundberg. Aames contract at R. 963. He was paid
the maximum fee allowed by the FNMA guidelines. FNMA allowed only the actual costs
incurred. He was paid more than what was allowed because his costs were bumped up by
the kickbacks and administrative fees of his dummy corporation.
Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to not charge more than allowed under the
Aames contract and FNMA. He breached that duty.
II.

Fact issues exist that make summary judgment inappropriate.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Blodgett that whether a confidential

relationship or fiduciary duty existed was an issue usually involving facts that had to be
sorted out by the jury. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d at 302. Whether the foreclosing
trustee in Blodgett owed a fiduciary duty to the trustors was a question of fact and summary
judgment was held to be inappropriate. Id at 304.
In Banberry Crossing, the Utah Supreme Court set forth a test of whether the trustee
owed a fiduciary duty to the trustor. The Court expressly noted that the existence of such
a duty would be implied from the factual situation of a particular case. First Sec. Bank of
Utah. N.A. v. Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d at 1256.
The Russells set forth the following facts that should be viewed in a light most
favorable to them. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah. 779 P.2d at 637:1) Lundberg
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was the trustee under a trust deed that limited the costs that he could charge to his actual
costs; 2) the Utah foreclosure statute limited his costs to actual costs; 3) the servicing
contract with Aames limited the costs to actual costs; 4) he owed a duty of honesty towards
the Russells and possibly the higher duty of a fiduciary; 5) he almost doubled the price of
posting the foreclosure notices by assessing an administrative fee for Rodney Services, a
corporation owned by him and his children (the profits of which went into his pocket); 6)
Rodney charged a similar administrative fee for publishing the notices; 7) the only action
taken by Rodney to earn the administrative fee was faxing the notices to the persons posting
and publishing the notices, which action was the same taken by Lundberg's staff prior to
Rodney's existence, and which action was part of the foreclosure process for which
Lundberg was paid $550 for each foreclosure; 8) Lundberg took kickbacks from the
Commercial Record for publishing his notices; 9) Lundberg took "commissions" from
Backman-Stewart for providing the TSG's on his foreclosures, which commissions were
substantial; 10) Lundberg admitted in the section on Utah foreclosure law that he wrote for
the desk reference book used in the industry by other trustees that he was limited to
collecting only his actual costs; 11) the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, VA, FHA limited
Lundberg to his actual costs; 12) he and Canyon Anderson of Backman-Stewart were
worried about violating the Utah Insurance Code by splitting the premiums on the TSG's
and were worried about an investigation by the Utah Insurance Department so they
exchanged letters and prepared a contract that tried to hide the split of commissions by
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claiming that Lundberg would sign the TSG's and perform title clearing work to justify the
split of the TSG premiums; 13) Lundberg never signed the TSG's, they were signed by
insurance agents of Backman-Stewart (this argument by Lundberg is irrelevant because the
insurance code required that actual work be performed in searching the title before a
premium could be split and Lundberg never searched titles); 14) Lundberg never performed
title clearing work for Backman-Stewart, which work was required by the lenders such as
Aames' requirement in its contract with Lundberg; 15) after this suit was filed and served,
Lundberg and Backman-Stewart tried to hid the kickbacks for the TSG's even deeper by
starting to pay Lundberg $ 15,000.00 per month for legal work (for which he never kept time
sheets or allocated fees by project) and $4,000.00 per month as a salary as an officer of
Backman-Stewart; and 16) the Russells and the other Utah borrowers whose homes were at
risk of loss by Lundberg's foreclosures had to pay the artificially inflated fees in order to
stop the foreclosures.
The view of the foregoing facts in a light most favorable to the Russells leads one to
believe that Lundberg violated the trust deed, violated Utah's foreclosure statute, violated
the rules of FNMA, FHLMC, VA, and FHA, and violated the duty of honesty owed to the
trustors. These facts also leads one to believe that Lundberg was in a fiduciary relationship
with the trustors, including the Russells, because he stood in a dominant position by
controlling the loss of their homes, he knew of the amount of the costs and what could be
legally charged, and he knew that he was gouging the trustors.

44

The trial court ignored these facts and granted summary judgment.
in.

In the alternative, Mr, Lundberg was unjustly enriched by collecting more costs
than he actually incurred in the foreclosures.
The Russells claim that Mr. Lundberg was unjustly enriched. The elements of unjust

enrichment are: 1) the defendant received a benefit; 2) the defendant knew of the benefit;
3) it is unjust under the circumstances for the defendant to retain the benefit

Davies v.

Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987).
However, unjust enrichment is available only where there is no remedy under a
contract. Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d at 109. The trial court held that Mr.
Lundberg was not a party to the contract, the trust deed. The Russells alleged unjust
enrichment as an alternative cause of action if a contractual remedy at law was not available.
The facts demonstrate that Mr. Lundberg received a benefit in the form of the inflated costs,
he knew of the* benefit and that it is unjust for him to retain the benefit. If the Court
determines that there is no contractual claim at law, then an equitable claim for unjust
enrichment should be preserved.
IV.

The defendants violated the Utah Unfair Practices Act.
The defendants argued that the Utah Unfair Practices Act ("UUPA") did not apply

to the facts. The trial court agreed and dismissed the Russell's claim.
The purpose of the UUPA is to prevent unfair competition, especially through
discrimination in the price of a product that tends to substantially lessen competition or tends
to create a monopoly. Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc. 146 P.2d 203 (Utah 1944); and Utah Code
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Ann.§ 13-5-3(1 )(a). The Act only allows differentials in price where the differences are the
result of cost savings in the creation of each item of product because of the large quantity
of product that is ordered by a particular customer. Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-3(l)(b)(I). In
order to qualify for this exception, the cost of manufacture of each item must be decreased
by the large quantity of product. Id. Where there is no savings in the cost of manufacture
of a product because of the quantity, then a transaction is not exempt from the Act. Id.
Lundberg argued that because of the large number of TSG's that he ordered, the cost
of preparing them decreased and his commission is payment for this decrease. However,
Lundberg offers no evidence of such a decrease. Logic also does not support his claim. The
primary cost of the TSG's is the cost of the title search on the home that is being foreclosed.
The steps that the title company needs to complete for each title search are the same
regardless of the number of TSG's that are prepared. Each house and the state of its title is
unique. The title needs to be searched on each house in the same manner whether one TSG
is issued or 1,000 TSG's are issued on different properties. Thus, the TSG's do not qualify
for the exemption of Section 13-5-3(l)(b)(I).
The commissions or kickbacks paid to Lundberg by Backman-Stewart and also by
the Intermountain Commercial Record substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly. Lundberg handles thousands of foreclosures in the state of Utah each year. He
sends all of his TSG work to Backman-Stewart because of the commission that he receives.
The commission actually translates into a much lower price for the title work than the same
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title product would cost from another title company. Because of the commission and the
resulting lower price, Lundberg has chosen to send all of his TSG work to BackmanStewart. This has created a monopoly for the TSG work on thousands of foreclosures each
year in the state of Utah. The other title companies cannot compete because they will not
engage in the illegal kickbacks paid to Lundberg.
The defendants argued that the Russells do not have standing to complain about the
violation of the Act. He correctly points out that the Russells do not sell TSGs. He also
argues that they are not purchasers of TSGs. He contends that Lundberg is the purchaser.
Yet, the Russells and the other borrowers who ultimately pay Lundberg' s inflated TSG costs
in order to save their homes are the parties who are actually purchasing the TSGs. They pay
for the TSGs. Lundberg does not. Lundberg passes the cost of the TSGs on to them, albeit
an inflated cost that does not account for the kickback that Lundberg receives for the TSGs.
Rodney argued that it was not involved in anti-competitive acts that would make it
liable under the UUPA. Rodney, however, is the conduit through which kickbacks and
illegal discounts for posting and publication by the Commercial Record are funneled to
Lundberg or his family. These kickbacks are not offered to other attorneys who publish
their legal notices with the Commercial Record. Neither are the posting discounts offered
to others.
Rodney is liable for this price discrimination. Indeed, Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-6
expressly ties any person or entity who aids or abets in the discrimination to liability for the
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scheme.
V.

The defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy.
The trial court dismissed the Russell's claim for civil conspiracy because it ruled that

the acts of the defendants were lawful.
A elements of a civil conspiracy are: 1) the combination of two or more persons; 2)
with an object to be accomplished; 3) a meeting of the minds to accomplish the object; 4)
one or more unlawful, overt acts; and 5) damages. Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon. 746 P.2d
785, 790 (Utah 1987). Mr. Lundberg, Mr. Anderson, and their companies engaged in a
scheme to kickback portions of the premiums on TSGs. The kickbacks resulted in a cost of
the TSG's much less than their cost assessed to the borrowers/trustors in order to save their
homes from foreclosure. Mr. Lundberg and Rodney engaged in a scheme of phoney,
unnecessary administrative expenses that almost doubled the price of posting the foreclosure
notices. Mr. Lundberg, Rodney and the Commercial Record engaged in a scheme of similar
unnecessary administrative expenses and kickbacks that inflated the cost of publication.
These acts were overt and, as argued above, unlawful. A civil conspiracy occurred.
VI,

Punitive damages should be awarded against Mr. Lundberg.
The trial court dismissed the claim for punitive damages.
Punitive damages may be awarded if the Russells establish by clear and convincing

evidence that Mr. Lundberg's acts were willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward their rights.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 78-18-1. Mr. Lundberg knew that he was limited to collecting only actual
costs incurred in his foreclosures. He held himself out as an expert in the industry. He
prepared a summary of Utah foreclosure law in The National Mortgage Servicer's Reference
Directory, a desk book used by other trustees in their foreclosures. He wrote in the Directory
that "[t]he lender may recover fees, costs and advances provided they are reasonable,
actually incurred and permitted by the documents." [Emphasis added.]

R.927.

Notwithstanding this knowledge, Mr. Lundberg formed a dummy corporation owned by his
family to hid unnecessary administrative fees that doubled the cost of posting. The
corporation also took kick backs from the Commercial Record for publication and charged
a similar unnecessary administrative fee for faxing the notice to the Commercial Record.
Mr. Lundberg and Canyon Anderson of Backman-Stewart created a commission,
which was simply a kickback, for the large volume of TSG work provided by Lundberg.
These commissions hid the actual cost of the TSGs to Mr. Lundberg which was much lower
than the costs charged to the borrowers/trustors. They changed the form of the kickbacks
several times in response to the state of Utah's investigation of their splitting of title
insurance premiums and in response to this lawsuit.
The elements of punitive damages exist in this case. The jury should have the right
to consider such damages.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the claims of the
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Russells, and remand the matter for trial.
Dated this ffiJ-day of July, 2003.
Hoole & King
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ADDENDUM
1.

Utah Code Ann.§§ 57-1-20 to 34.

2.

Memorandum Decision filed September 30, 2002.

3.
Order Dismissing Without Prejudice Certain Claims Against the Backman
Defendants filed October 10, 2002.
4.

Partial Summary Judgment for Lundberg Defendants filed October 30, 2002.

5.

Memorandum Decision filed August 14, 2003.

6.
Order Granting the Lundberg Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Granting Rodney Service Co.'s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting the Backman Defendants' Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class filed September 8,2003.
7.
Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of the Backman Stewart Defendants on
Remaining Claims filed October 1, 2003.
8.

Order of Dismissal with Prejudice filed November 4, 2003.
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57-1-20

(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed
as security for the performance of an obligation.
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person
named in the deed to a beneficiary.
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed
by trust deed, or his successor in interest.
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 57-1-1.
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust deed.
History: L. 1961, c h . 181, § 1; 1988, ch.
155, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Mortgage distinguished.
Trustee must be identified in instrument.
Morteatre d i s t i n g u i s h e d
Mortgage a i s t m g u i s n e a .
Unlike a trust deed, a mortgage in Utah is
,..,
. \
t rpu
,
not a title-conveying instrument. The mortgagor retains legal title, and the mortgagee's
interest is a lien on the property to secure
payment of a debt. General Glass Corp. v. Mast
Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
A trust deed is similar to a mortgage in that
it is given as security for the performance of an
obligation. However, a trust deed is a convey-

ance by which title to the trust property passes
to the trustee. Upon default, the trustee has
p o w e r t o s e l l t h e p r 0 p e r t y to satisfy the trust o r ' s d e b t t o t h e beneficiary. First Sec. Bank v.
Banberry Crossing, 780 R2d 1253 (Utah 1989);
Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d
innr^
1 1 A 1 /TT , u n,
A
1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
*^
Trustee must b e identified in instrument.
Purported deed of trust recorded by savings
and loan association was ineffective as a titleconveying instrument where it did not identify
or name the trustee, who was the grantee
under the deed. General Glass Corp. v. Mast
Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 54A Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages
§ 146 et seq.

C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5 et seq.

57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property — Purposes —
Effect.
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of
an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a
beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property
acquired by the trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the
execution of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for the
obligation or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed in like
manner as if acquired before execution of the trust deed.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 6.
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57-1-21

REAL ESTATE

57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications.
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(i) any member of the Utah State Bar;
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or
insurance company authorized to do business in U t a h under the laws
of Utah or the United States;
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a t r u s t business in Utah
under the laws of Utah or the United States;
(iv) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do
business in Utah under the laws of Utah;
(v) any agency of the United States government; or
(vi) any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or
regulated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor,
(b) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a t r u s t deed existing
prior to the effective date of this chapter, nor to any agreement t h a t is
supplemental to t h a t trust deed.
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed,
unless the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii),
(iii), (v), or (vi).
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 3; 1963, ch.
110, § 1; 1969, c h . 162, § 1; 1985, ch. 64, § 1;
1996, ch. 182, § 25.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, added the Subsection (l)(a) and (l)(b) designations, redesignating former Subsections (l)(a) to (f) as (l)(a)(i) to
(vi); substituted "depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103" for "bank, building
and loan association, savings and loan associa-

tion" in Subsection (l)(a)(ii); and made related
and stylistic changes.
"Effective d a t e of t h i s chapter." — The
phrase "effective date of this chapter," in Subsection (l)(b), first appeared in this section as
amended by L. 1985, ch. 64, § 1. That act (L
1985, ch. 64) took effect on April 29, 1985.
Cross-References. — Utah State Bar, § 7851-1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 5, 78.

57-1-22.

Successor trustees — Appointment by beneficiary — Effect — Substitution of trustee — Recording — Form.

(1) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for
record in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the trust
property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the
time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the
power, duties, authority, and title of the trustee named in the deed of trust and
of any successor trustee.
(2) The substitution shall:
(a) identify the trust deed by stating the names of the original parties
thereto, the date of recordation, and the book and page where the same is
recorded or the entry number;
(b) include the legal description of the trust property;
(c) state the name of the new trustee; and
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57-1-23

CONVEYANCES

(d) be executed and acknowledged by all of the beneficiaries under the
trust deed or their successors in interest
(3) l i not previously recorded, at ftie time 01 recording *^ e notice of deiauYt,
t k e successor trustee shall file for record the substitution of trustee, and a copy
there°f shall be sent in the m a n n e r provided m Section #7-1-26 to all persons
t 0 w n o m a copy of the notice of default would be required to be mailed by
Section 57 1-26 In addition thereto, a copy shall be sent to the prior trustee by
r e g u l a r rnail to his last-known address
(4) A substitution of trustee shall be sufficient if mad^ m substantially the
following form
Substitution of Trustee
(insert name and address of new t r u s t s )
hereby appointed successor trustee under the trust deed executed by
as trustor, m which
is named benenc* a r v a n d
as
y
trustee, and filed for record
(month/day/year), and recorded m Book
_, Page
, Records of
County, (or filed for record
,
(month/day/year), with recorder's entry No
>
County), Utah
1S

(Insert legal description)
Signature ^
(Certificate of Acknowledgment)
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 4; 1981, c h .
100, § 1; 1989, ch. 88, § 1; 2000, c h . 75, § 23.
A m ^ 1 1 d i n e n t N o t e s . — The 2000 amend

ment, effective May *> 2000, updated the date
lines in the form in Subsection (4)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C J S Mortgages § 79

57-1-23. Sale of trust property — Power of trustee —
Foreclosure of trust deed*
A power of sale is hereby conferred upon the trustee which the trustee may
exercise and under which t h e t r u s t property may be sold m ^ n e m a n n e r
hereinafter provided, after a breach of an obligation f ° r which the trust
property 1S conveyed as security, or, at the option of th£ beneficiary, a t r u s t
deed m a v be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of
mortgages on real property The power of sale may be e x e r c i s e a < by the trustee
without express provision therefor in the trust deed
History: L 1961, c h 181, § 5.

293

57-1-24

REAL ESTATE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joint tenancies
Mortgage foreclosure method
Procedural requirements
Cited

tiff sought to foreclose on a t r u s t deed in the
manner provided for foreclosure of mortgages,
even though, in selecting the alternative rem
edy, plaintiff obtained costs and attorney fees
far in excess of those provided for in § 57 1 31
Secunty Title Co v Payless Bldrs Supply, 17
Utah 2d 179, 407 P2d 141 (1965)

Joint tenancies.
The rule that a joint tenancy is severed by
one tenant's conveyance applies not only to
voluntary conveyances, but also to involuntary
conveyances pursuant to judicial rules Jolley v
Cony, 671 P 2d 139 (Utah 1983)
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obhga
tion to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase
of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to
be for the benefit of all cotenants Jolley v
Cony, 671 P 2 d 139 (Utah 1983)

Procedural requirements.
The detailed procedural requirements for a
trustee's sale of real property under §§ 57 1 23
through 57 1 34 are intended to protect the
debtor/trustor, and provide protections that
substitute for the six month n g h t of redemption guaranteed in judicial mortgage foreclosures Jones v Johnson, 761 P 2 d 37 (Utah Ct
App 1988)

Mortgage foreclosure m e t h o d .
Defendant could not claim error where plain-

Cited in Timm v Dewsnup, 1999 UT 105,
990 P 2d 942

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59A C J S Mortgages §§ 599, 600
AX.R. — Failure to keep up insurance as

justifying foreclosure under acceleration provision in mortgage or deed of trust, 69 A L R 3d
774

57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of
default.
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not be exercised until
(1) the trustee first files for record, in the office of the recorder of each
county where the trust property or some part or parcel thereof is situated,
a notice of default, identifying the t r u s t deed by stating the name of the
trustor named therein and giving the book and page where the trust deed
is recorded and a legal description of the trust property, and containing a
statement that a breach of an obligation for which the trust property was
conveyed as security has occurred, and setting forth the n a t u r e of that
breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold the property to satisfy
the obligation,
(2) not less than three months has thereafter elapsed; and
(3) after the lapse of at least three months the trustee shall give notice
of sale as provided m this act
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, * 6; 1967, ch.
131, § 1; 1989, ch. 88, § 2.

M e a n i n g of "this act." — Laws 1961, ch
181 enacted §§ 57-1-19 through 57-1-36

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Three-month time period
Cited
T h r e e - m o n t h time period.
Former Bankruptcy Rule 601 (see now 11

U S C § 362), which provides that the filing of
a bankruptcy petition shall operate as a stay of
any act to enforce a hen against property l
custody of the bankruptcy court, does not su
pend the running of the three-month time p e
nod required by this section McCarthy

294

CONVEYANCES
Lewis, 615 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1980).
Trustee's sale was upheld, even though notice
0 f the sale was mailed only two months after an
amended notice of default was recorded, because there was no showing that the procedural
irregularity resulted from fraud or unfair dealing, and all parties were afforded the rights and

57-1-25

protections the statutory requirements for a
nonjudicial foreclosure were intended to ensure. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v.
Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah C t App. 1990).
Cited in Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59AC.J.S. Mortgages § 621 et seq.

57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of p r o p e r t y
— Time and place of sale.
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale
particularly describing the property to be sold:
(a) by publication of the notice, at least three times, once a week for
three consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least ten days but not
more t h a n 30 days prior to the sale, in some newspaper having a general
circulation in each county in which the property to be sold, or some part
thereof, is situated; and
(b) by posting the notice, at least 20 days before the date of sale, in some
conspicuous place on the property to be sold and also in at least three
public places of each city or county in which the property to be sold, or
some p a r t thereof, is situated.
(2) The sale shall be held at the time and place designated in the notice of
sale which shall be between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. and at the
courthouse of the county in which the property to be sold, or some part thereof,
is situated.
(3) The notice of sale shall be sufficient if made in substantially the
following form:
Notice of Trustee's Sale
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder, payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale, at the
in
,
County, Utah, on
(month/day/year),
at
m. of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by
.
and
, his wife, as trustors, in favor of
, covering real
property located at
, and more particularly described as:
(Insert legal description)
(Certificate of Acknowledgment, if recorded)
Dated

(month/day/year).
Trustee

History: L. 1961, c h . 181, § 7; 1981, ch.
100, § 2; 1989, ch. 88, § 3; 2000, ch. 75, § 24.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2000 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date
lines in the form in Subsection (3) and made
stylistic changes.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Error in n o t i c e .
—Validity of sale.
Validity of a sale was not affected by a typographical error in a notice dated October 1,
1983, which indicated that the sale would take

place on October 28, 1982, where the notice did
not confuse bidders or result in an undervalu
a t l o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y Concepts, Inc v First Sec
Realty gervs ?Inc

?43 p 2 d

n 5 g

(Ufcah

198?>

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59A C J S Mortgages § 608 et seq

57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of default and notice of sale — Mailing by trustee or beneficiary —
Publication of notice of default.
(1) (a) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of default and of any notice
of sale under any trust deed may, at any time subsequent to the filing for
record of the trust deed and prior to the filing for record of a notice of
default thereunder, file for record in the office of the county recorder of any
county in which any part or parcel of the trust property is situated, a duly
acknowledged request for a copy of any notice of default and notice of sale
The request shall set forth the name and address of the person or persons
requesting copies of such notices and shall identify the trust deed by
stating the names of the original parties thereto, the date of filing for
record thereof, the book and page where the same is recorded or the
recorder's entry number, and the legal description of the trust property
The request shall be in substantially the following form:
REQUEST FOR NOTICE
Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of default and a copy
of notice of sale under the trust deed filed for record
.—
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records
of
County, (or filed for record
(month/day/year), with
recorder's entry number
,
County), Utah, executed by
as trustor, in which
is named as beneficiary and
as trustee, be mailed to
(insert name)
at
(insert address)
(Insert legal description)
Signature

—-—

(Certificate of Acknowledgement)
(b) Upon filing for record of a request for notice, the recorder shall index
the request in the mortgagor's index, mortgagee's index, and abstract
record. Except as provided in this section, the trustee under any such deed
of trust is not required to send notice of default or notice of sale to any
person not filing a request for notice as described herein.
(2) Not later t h a n ten days after recordation of a notice of default, the
trustee or beneficiary shall mail, by certified or registered mail, with postage
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prepaid, a copy of such notice with the recording date shown thereon,
addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a request
therefor which has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of
default, directed to the address designated in the request. At least 20 days
before the date of sale, the trustee shall mail, by certified or registered mail,
with postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of the time and place of sale,
addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a request
therefor which has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of
default, directed to the address designated in the request.
(3) Any trust deed may contain a request that a copy of any notice of default
and a copy of any notice of sale thereunder be mailed to any person a party
thereto at the address of the person set forth therein, and a copy of any notice
of default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to each such person at the
same time and in the same manner required as though a separate request
therefor had been filed by each of such persons as provided in this section.
(4) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the trust deed and if no request
for notice by the trustor has been recorded as provided in this section, a copy
of the notice of default shall be published at least three times, once a week for
three consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in each county
in which the trust property, or some part thereof, is situated, such publication
to commence not later t h a n ten days after the filing for record of the notice of
default. In lieu of this publication, a copy of the notice of default may be
delivered personally to the trustor within the ten days or at any time before
publication is completed.
(5) No request for a copy of any notice filed for record p u r s u a n t to this
section, nor any statement or allegation in any such request, nor any record
thereof, shall affect the title to trust property or be considered notice to any
person that any person requesting copies of notice of default or of notice of sale
has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or claim upon, the trust
property.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 8; 1980, ch. 57,
§ 1; 1981, ch. 100, § 3; 1989, ch. 88, § 4; 2000,
ch. 75, § 25.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2000 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date
lines in the form in Subsection (l)(a) and made
stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
C i t e d in First Sec. Bank v. Felger, 658 F.
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987); Hall v. NACM Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, 988 F.2d 942.

57-1-27. Sale of trust property by public auction — Postponement of sale.
(1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale,
the trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public
auction to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may
conduct the sale and act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the trust property
shall be sold, if the property consists of several known lots or parcels which can
be sold to advantage separately. The trustee or attorney for the trustee shall
follow these directions. Any person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may
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bid at the sale Each bid is considered an irrevocable offer, and if the purchaser
refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property sold to him at the sale,
the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again sell the property at any
time to the highest bidder The party refusing to pay the bid price is liable for
any loss occasioned by the refusal, including interest, costs, and trustee's and
reasonable attorneys' fees The trustee or the attorney for the trustee may
thereafter reject any other bid of t h a t person
(2) The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers expedi
ent, postpone the sale up to a period not to exceed 72 hours If the last hour of
the postponement falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the sale
may be postponed until the same hour of the next day which is not a Saturday,
a Sunday, or a legal holiday The person conducting the sale shall give notice
of the postponement by public declaration at the time and place last appointed
for the sale No other notice of the postponed sale is required, unless the sale
is postponed for longer t h a n 72 hours beyond the date designated in the notice
of sale In the event of a longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and
renoticed in the same m a n n e r as the original notice of sale is required to be
given
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 9; 1985, ch. 68,
§ 1; 1988, ch. 82, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Fair market v a l u e bid.
A trust deed beneficiary's offer of "fair market
value" for property sold at a trustee's sale was
the equivalent of a fixed dollar offer and was
therefore a bid for purposes of Subsection (1)
As the only bid, it was also the highest bid, and

the trustee was required by the statute to
accept it Thus the trustee was not permitted
to postpone, cancel, or renotice the sale pursu
ant to Subsection (2) Thomas v Johnson 801
P 2 d 186 (Utah Ct App 1990)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59A C J S Mortgages § 622 et seq
A.L.R. — Mortgagor's interference with

property subject to order of foreclosure and sale
as contempt of court 54 A L R 3d 1242

57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee — Payment of
bid — Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser —Recitals — Effect.
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price bid as directed by the
trustee and upon receipt of payment, the trustee shall execute and deliver his
deed to such purchaser The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance
with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the
exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described therein,
including recitals concerning any mailing, personal delivery, and publication of
the notice of default, any mailing and the publication and posting of the notice
of sale, and the conduct of sale These recitals constitute prima facie evidence
of such compliance and are conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers
and encumbrancers for value and without notice
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right
of redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, interest, and claim of the
trustor and his successors in interest and of all persons claiming by, through,
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or under them, in and to the property sold, including all such right, title,
interest, and claim in and to such property acquired by the trustor or his
successors in interest subsequent to the execution of the trust deed.
History: L. 1961, c h . 181, § 10; 1985, ch.
68, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty
Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 645 et seq.

57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale — Disposition.
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, first, to the costs
and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the
payment of the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the
amount which may be provided for in the trust deed, second, to payment of the
obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the person or
persons legally entitled to the proceeds, or the trustee, in his discretion, may
deposit the balance of the proceeds with the clerk of the district court of the
county in which the sale took place. Upon depositing the balance, the trustee
shall be discharged from all further responsibility and the clerk shall deposit
the proceeds with the state treasurer subject to the order of the district court.
History: L. 1961, c h . 181, § 11; 1997, c h .
215, § 7.
Amendment
Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, deleted "county"

before "clerk" and inserted "district court of
the" near the end of the first sentence; substituted "state" for "county" in the second sentence; and made stylistic changes throughout.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Duties of trustee.
A trustee under t r u s t deed has an affirmative
duty to uphold his statutory responsibilities,
and may not ignore those responsibilities in

order to assist certain interest holders at the
expense of others. Randall v. Valley Title, 681
P.2d 219 (Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 664 et seq.

57-1-30, Sale of trust property by trustee — Corporate
stock evidencing water rights given to secure
trust deed.
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights used, intended to be used,
or suitable for use on the trust property and which are hypothecated to secure
an obligation secured by a trust deed may be sold with the t r u s t property, or
any part thereof, at the trustee's sale in the manner provided in this act.
299

57-1-31

REAL ESTATE

History: L. 1961, ch. 181, & 12.
M e a n i n g of "this act." — See note under
same catchhne following § 57-1-24

57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obligations secured — Reinstatement — Cancellation
of recorded notice of default.
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, taxes,
assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in
accordance with terms of the obligation or of the trust deed, the trustor or his
successor in interest in the trust property or any part thereof or any other
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon or any
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within three months of
the filing for record of notice of default under the trust deed, if the power of sale
is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or his successor in interest the
entire amount then due under the terms of the trust deed (including costs and
expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust
deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other t h a n that
portion of the principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, and
thereby cure the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all proceedings
theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the
obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force
and effect the same as if no such acceleration had occurred.
(2) If the default is cured and the t r u s t deed reinstated in the manner
provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of
any person having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to him
a request to the trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of
the recorded notice of default under the trust deed; and any beneficiary under
a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after such demand,
refuses to request the trustee to execute and deliver this cancellation is liable
to the person entitled to such request for all damages resulting from this
refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee or beneficiary, or both,
or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a cancellation of a notice of
default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a trust
deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient if made
and executed by the trustee in substantially the following form:
Cancellation of Notice of Default
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of
County, (or filed of record
(month/day/year), with recorder's entry No
,
County), Utah, which notice of default refers to
the trust deed executed by
as trustor, in which
is named as
beneficiary and
as trustee, and filed for record
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of _———-300
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(month/day/year), with recorder's entry
County, (or filed of record
jvfo. .
,
County), Utah.
(legal description)
Signature of Trustee
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 13; 1967, ch.
131, § 2; 1981, ch. 100, § 4; 1985, ch. 68, § 3;
2000, ch. 75, § 26.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2000 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date
lines in the form in Subsection (2) and made
stylistic changes throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendment.
—Applicability.
—Effect.
Debt acceleration.
Default not cured.
Reinstatement.
Amendment.
-—Applicability.
The 1985 amendment to this section could
not be retroactively applied to a contractual
transaction entered into before the amendment, where the amendment affected the debtor's substantive contractual rights by eliminating his right to cure a default under his trust
deed and note by paying only the amount in
default. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood
Assocs., 795 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
—Effect
The 1985 amendment of this section changed
the law to require the debtor to pay the entire
amount of the note in order to cure his default
in a judicial foreclosure proceeding. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 R2d
665 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Debt acceleration.
Debt acceleration is a substantive right because it provides a beneficiary with the power
to bring a single foreclosure action upon default, thereby satisfying the entire obligation
and discharging the note, rather than bringing
repeated collection actions each time a trustor
defaults. The beneficiary thereby avoids the
burden of repeated foreclosures as well as the
nsk that the security for the debt, the property,

will be consumed by legal fees, court costs,
unpaid interest, etc., before the debt is satisfied. Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806
P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
"Deacceleration" is the undoing of the acceleration itself. The parties are returned to their
preacceleration status as if the beneficiary of
the trust deed had not opted to accelerate the
entire debt. The default, however, remains unchanged and the notice of default would still be
in effect. A beneficiary could still foreclose, but
it would only be for the amount of the delinquent payments, costs, and so forth. The note
would remain in effect to the extent not satisfied from the sale proceeds and the trustor
would retain any property not sold to satisfy
the delinquency. Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v.
Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Default not cured.
The plaintiff had no duty to fulfill his offer to
treat the defendants' default as cured when
that offer was predicated upon payment of the
arrearage, taxes, and insurance, and only the
arrearage had been paid. Grossen v. DeWitt,
1999 UT App 167, 982 P.2d 581.
Reinstatement.
"Reinstatement," as it is used in this section,
is the curing of the default. In other words, the
parties are returned to their former status as if
the default had never occurred. If a trustor
subsequently defaults again, the beneficiary
must begin new foreclosure proceedings. It may
not rely on the previous notice of default and
declaration of acceleration. Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 547.
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Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to
recover balance due upon obligation for which
trust deed was given as security — Collection of
costs and attorney's fees.

At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust
deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security,
and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such
property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale Before
rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the date of
sale of the property sold The court may not render judgment for more than the
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair
market value of the property as of the date of the sale In any action brought
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, c h .
68, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Attorney fees
Deficiency judgment
Exclusive remedy
Multiple hens
Notice
One action rule
Out of state lands
Preemption by federal law
Prevailing party
Procedural failure
Purpose of section
Cited
Attorney fees.
Trial court did not err in granting debtors
attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party,
because, although a judgment was entered
against them, they prevailed on the only contested issue at trial Occidental/Nebraska Fed
Sav Bank v Mehr, 791 P 2 d 217 (Utah Ct App
1990)
Deficiency j u d g m e n t .
When a creditor takes more t h a n one item of
security upon an obligation secured by a trust
deed, the creditor is not precluded from making
use of t h a t additional security merely because
the creditor h a s not sought a deficiency judgment within three months of a nonjudicial sale
of one of the items covered by the trust deed
property, nor is the creditor required to seek a
deficiency judgment under this section in order

to maintain its right to the additional security,
so long as the security is applied toward the
debt owed on the original loan Phillips v Utah
State Credit Union, 811 P 2 d 174 (Utah 1991)
A "sold out nonforeclosing junior lienor," who
became unsecured by a senior lienor's foreclo
sure, was not pursuing a "deficiency judgment"
and therefore, was not limited by the fair
market value provision of this section from
pursuing its claim against the debtor person
ally City Consumer Servs , Inc v Peters, 815
P2d 234 (Utah 1991)
The protections of the Utah Trust Deed Act
(§§ 57 1 19 to 57 1 36) apply to any action to
recover the balance due on an obligation se
cured by a trust deed, following a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale, and makes no distinction
whether it is brought against the debtor or a
guarantor, t h u s , t h e three month statute of
limitations applied to bar an action against the
guarantors of an obligation and, even if the
action had been timely filed, the fair value
credit would have required plaintiff to credit
the fair market value toward the deficiency
preventing a double recovery from defendants
as either guarantors or debtors Surety L " e
Ins Co v Smith, 892 P 2 d 1 (Utah 1995)
E x c l u s i v e remedy.
This section provides the exclusive remedy
for securing a deficiency judgment following a
sale of real property under a trust deed, thereby
precluding the pursuance of any other r e r n e ^
once the sale has been made Cox v Green, 69
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P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985); Concepts, Inc. v. First
Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah
1987).
Multiple liens.
The burden of protecting property subject to
multiple liens is on the debtor, not on the junior
lienholder. Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134
(Utah 1992).
Notice.
The primary purpose of the three-month
limitation period contained in this section is
satisfied when the foreclosing party provides
notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be
sought by filing the action. Standard Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah
1991).
One-action rule.
A pretrial stipulation between a debtor and
the debtor's junior lienholder to limit the junior
lienholder's judgment to the difference between
the debt owed and the fair market value of the
property at the time of sale was meant to apply
to the deficiency judgment after sale, as provided by this section, so when the trial court
later ruled that the junior lienholders were
entitled to collect against the underlying obligation, as their security had been extinguished
through the intervening trustee's sale by the
senior lienholder, the one-action rule (§ 78-371) did not limit the junior lienholder's judgment
because defendants' conduct was not blameworthy. Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134 (Utah
1992).
Out-of-state lands.
Deficiency judgment protection requiring
that fair market value of property at time of
sale be used as setoff is not extended to debtors
whose obligations are secured by trust deeds on
land outside Utah. Bullington v. Mize, 25 Utah
2d 173, 478 P.2d 500, 44 A.L.R.3d 910 (1970).
P r e e m p t i o n by federal law.
The three-month limitation of this section
could not be used to bar the Small Business
Administration's post-foreclosure deficiency action against guarantor, as to do so would violate
the well-established maxim that the United
States is exempt from application of state statutes of limitation. United States v. Johnson,
946 F. Supp. 915 (D. Utah 1996).

57-1-32

P r e v a i l i n g party.
If a party seeking a deficiency judgment can
convince the court that the debt exceeds the fair
market value of the property, then that party is
entitled to a deficiency judgment and prevails
under this section; however, if the party defending such an action successfully maintains that
the fair market value of the property equals or
exceeds the total indebtedness, then that party
prevails. First S.W. Fin. v. Sessions, 875 P.2d
553 (Utah 1994).
Procedural failure.
This section, which gives a creditor three
months after a sale of property under a trust
deed to bring an action for any amounts remaining unpaid, does not permanently bar further proceedings any time some procedural
failing results in the dismissal of a properly
filed action. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Kirkbride, 821 R2d 1136 (Utah 1991). •
P u r p o s e of section.
The purpose of this section is to protect the
debtor, who in a nonjudicial foreclosure has no
right of redemption, from a creditor who could
purchase the property at the sale for a low price
and then hold the debtor liable for a large
deficiency. First Sec. Bank v. Felger, 658 F.
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987).
This section limits only the rights of the
beneficiary under the trust deed that was foreclosed — it does not affect the rights and
obligations of parties to other trust deeds. The
statute does not purport to address the status
of obligations secured by junior trust deeds
following a trustee sale pursuant to a senior
trust deed. G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v.
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
By its terms and legislative ^history, this
section provides a remedy for a creditor facing a
defaulting debtor; where debtors did not default on creditor's mortgage, section was inapplicable. Associates Fin. Servs. v. Slaugh, 850
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993).
Cited in Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375 (Utah 1988); Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d
186 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Citicorp Mtg., Inc. v.
Hardy 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992); SLC Ltd. V v.
Bradford Group W., Inc., 152 Bankr. 755
(Bankr. D. Utah 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 674 et seq.
A.L.R. — Excessiveness or adequacy of attor-

neys' fees in matters involving real estate, 10
A.L.R.5th 448.
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57-1-33

57-1-33.

REAL ESTATE

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch 172, § 2 repeals
§ 57-1-33, as enacted by Laws 1961, ch 181,
§ 15, requiring reconveyance of trust property

upon satisfaction of an obligation secured by a
trust deed, effective May 2, 1994

57-1-33.1. Reconveyance of a trust deed,
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust
property.
(b) At the time the beneficiary requests a reconveyance under Subsection (l)(a), the beneficiary shall deliver to the trustee or the trustee's
successor in interest the trust deed and the note or other evidence that the
obligation securing the trust deed has been satisfied.
(2) The reconveyance under Subsection (1) may designate the grantee as
"the person or persons entitled thereto."
History: C. 1953, 57-1-33.1, e n a c t e d b y L.
1995, ch. 185, § 1.

57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee — Foreclosure
of trust deed — Limitation of actions.
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made, or an action
to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on
real property shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust deed.
History: L. 1961, c h . 181, § 16.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59A C J S Mortgages § 603

57-1-35. Trust deeds — Transfer of secured debts as transfer of security.
The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer
of the security therefor.
History: L. 1961, c h . 181, § 17.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C J S Mortgages § 336 et seq

57-1-36. Trust deeds — Instruments entitled to be recorded — Assignment of a beneficial interest.
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a beneficial interest
under a trust deed, notice of default, trustee's deed, reconveyance
of the trust
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAKES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE
RUSSELL, for themselves and for
all other similarly situated
individuals and entities,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

020901052

Plaintiffs,
vs.
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a Professional
Corporation; BACKMAN TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE SERVICES,
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership
CANYON ANDERSON; RODNEY SERVICE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for hearing on August 22,
2002, in connection with the Lundberg Parties' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Defendants Backman Title Company, BackmanStewart Title Services, Ltd. and Canyon Anderson's Motion to
Dismiss,

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court indicated

that it would take the matter under advisement to further consider
the arguments, the relevant case law and statutes and the written
submissions

of the parties.

advisement,

the Court has had

Since

taking

the Motions

an opportunity

under

to consider or

reconsider the law, all relevant pleadings, facts and the oral
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arguments in this case. Now being fully advised, the Court enters
the following Memorandum Decision.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Court first considers the Lundberg parties1 Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. This Motion pertains to the first four
causes of action asserted in the plaintiffs1 Complaint:

Breach of

Fiduciary Duty, Constructive Fraud (as a result of the alleged
breach of fiduciary duty), Breach of Contract and Breach of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
The first issue before the Court is whether the plaintiffs can
establish as a matter of law that defendant J. Scott Lundberg, the
trustee under their Trust Deed, owed them a fiduciary duty. After
carefully reviewing all of the cases cited by both sides, the Court
determines that a fiduciary relationship can arise between a
trustee and a trustor, but only under certain circumstances.
To be precise, the case of Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298
(Utah 1978), stands for the premise that a fiduciary relationship
between a trustee and a trustor arises only when the trustee and
trustor have a confidential relationship.

In other words, there

must be more to the relationship between the trustee and trustor
than the "mere utilization of trust deed in the loan transaction."
Id. at 302.
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In Blodqett, the confidential relationship was established
because the trustors (the Blodgetts) had a "significant previous
business history as borrowers and depositors" at the bank, that was
the original trustee under the Blodgetts' trust deed. Id. at 3 00.
The court emphasized that the Blodgetts and the bank were not
"strangers."

Based on this set of facts, the court found a

confidential relationship and therefore a fiduciary relationship to
have existed between the bank and the Blodgetts.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs and Mr.
Lundberg were complete strangers.

They had never met and had no

relationship whatsoever. As the Lundberg parties' counsel pointed
out during oral argument, Mr. Lundberg was just a name to the
plaintiffs. Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds as a
matter of law that Mr. Lundberg (and, as a corollary, the remaining
Lundberg parties) had no confidential relationship with the
plaintiffs.

In the absence of such a relationship, the Court

concludes as a matter of law that the Lundberg parties had no
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs.
The Court wants to make it clear that in reaching this
conclusion, the Court considered, but was unpersuaded by the
plaintiff's argument that a fiduciary relationship automatically
arises simply by virtue of the trustee holding that title.

The

Court was similarly unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that
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£he trust deed foreclosure statutes have the primary purpose of
protecting

the

fiduciary duty.

trustor

and

therefore

impose

an

independent

To -the contrary, the Court agrees with the

Lundberg parties that it is the protection of the beneficiary that
is the focus of these statutes.

Moreover, the few procedural

duties (not fiduciary duties) that are set forth in the statute
that may be construed as being for the protection of the trustor
(such as giving notice and selling the foreclosed property to the
highest bidder, etc.) were all complied with in this case.
Accordingly, having found that the Lundberg parties owed no
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, the Court grants their Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment as to the first two causes of action.
The Court next considers the plaintiffs1 claims that the
Lundberg parties had a contractual duty and the duty of good faith
and fair dealing.

The Court determines that Mr. Lundberg, as the

trustee, was not a contracting party with the plaintiffs, but
merely a facilitator of the contract between the plaintiffs and the
beneficiary of the trust deed. Mr. Lundberg gave no consideration
on this contract and asked for none. In general, Mr. Lundberg did
not bargain with respect to the contract and only became aware of
the trust deed when the plaintiffs defaulted and the beneficiary
implemented the foreclosure proceedings.

Therefore, the Court

concludes as a matter of law that the Lundberg parties had no
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have been breached.

As a

corollary, since there was no contract between the plaintiffs and
the Lundberg parties had no contractual duty, there was also no
duty or covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Accordingly, the

Court grants summary judgment to the Lundberg parties on the third
and fourth causes of action.
Next, the Backman defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs'
mistake and civil conspiracy claims for failure to state these
claims with sufficient particularity.

The Court has closely

examined these claims and concludes that they are not set forth
with the particularity required under the rules. As it stands, the
plaintiffs1 pleadings leave to conjecture vital information such as
precisely who was involved and in what specific scheme.

The

plaintiffs' responding memorandum tries to flesh out the additional
facts that provide the basis for these mistake and conspiracy
claims.

However, as the Backman defendants' point out, the claims

must be set forth with sufficient particularity in the pleadings,
not

in memos.

Having

found

that the

factual basis

of

the

plaintiffs' Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth Causes of Action is not set
forth with sufficient particularity, the Court dismisses these
claims without prejudice under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b).
This dismissal is predicated solely on Rule 9(b) and not on the
Backman defendants' alternative argument of dismissal under Rule
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12(b)(6) • In other words, the Court's inquiry ended when it found
that the claims were not sufficiently stated.

The Court did not

assess the merit of these claims under Rule 12(b)(6),
Counsel for the Lundberg parties and the Backman defendants
should prepare Orders on their respective Motions.

The Lundberg

parties1 Order should indicate that their Motion is granted in the
entirety.

The Backman defendants' Motion should indicate that

their Rule 9(b) Motion is granted, but that the dismissal is
without prejudice.
Dated this -f\j

day of September, 2002.

4
LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this ?U
September, 2002:

Lester A. Perry
Attorney for Plaintiff
4 276 S. Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
84124
R. Willis Orton
Daniel J. McDonald
Jason W. Beutler
Attorneys for Defendants Backman Title,
Backman-Stewart Title, and Canyon Anderson
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0120
Gary A. Weston
Richard M. Hymas
Attorneys for Defendants Lundberg
and Lundberg & Associates
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

ft

day of

R. Willis Orton (2484)
Daniel J. McDonald (7935)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone. (801)328-3600

^CCl^X^XMr.

Attorneys for Defendants Backman Title
Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd.
and Canyon Anderson

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other
similarly situated individuals and entities;

ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE CERTAIN CLAIMS
AGAINST THE BACKMAN
DEFENDANTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 020901052

J SCOTT LUNDBERG. LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a Professional Corporation;
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation. BACKMAN-STEWART
TITLE SERVICES. LTD . a Utah Limited
Partnership. CANYON ANDERSON.
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through
10.

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants

Defendants Backman Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd. and Canyon
Anderson (collectively the "Backman Defendants") filed a Motion to Dismiss Portions of the
Complaint. This motion came on for hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on August
22, 2002. Plaintiff was represented by Lester A. Perry. Defendants Lundberg and Lundberg &
Associates were represented by Gary A. Weston and Richard M. Hymas. The Backman
Defendants were represented by R. Willis Orton. Defendant Canyon Anderson was present in
the courtroom. Having heard argument of counsel and having considered the memoranda filed
by the parties, on September 30,2002, the court, for good cause shown, issued its Memorandum
Decision disposing of the Backman Defendants' morion. Therefore, based upon the
Memorandum Decision,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Backman Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and the Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth
Causes of Action of Plaintiffs Complaint are hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Leslie A. Lewis
District Judge

Approved as to form:

By
Lester A. Perry
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By
Gary A. Weston
Attorneys for Defendants Lundberg
and Lundberg ^Associates

B y _
R.WilIis Orton
Attorneys for the Backman Defendants

-1-

Approved as to form:

By
Lester A. Perry
Attorneys for Plaintiff

^^Attorneys ibr Defendants Lundberg
and Luodoerg <S^Associates

By_
FLWillis Orton
Attorneys for the Backman Defendants

Approved as to form:

By
Peny
AMneys for Plaintiff

By.
Gary A. Weston
Attorneys for Defendants Lundbcrg
and Lundbere ^Associates

By_
ILWillis Orion
Attoiueysforthe Bacbnan Defendants

-1-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING
CERTAIN CLAIMS AGAINST THE BACKMAN STEWART DEFENDANTS to be mailed,
postage prepaid, this^J^day of October, 2002, to:
Lester A. Perry
Hoole & King, L C
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124-2634
Gary Weston
Richard M. Hyraas
Nielsen & Senior
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

>MA\PCDOCS\DOCS^4 5653 \

-?-

Gary A. Weston USB No. 3435
Richard M. Hymas USB No. 1612
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1900
Facsimile: (801)532-1913

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 3 0 2002
outy Cler<<

Attorneys for Defendants
J. Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other
similarly situated individuals and entities,
Plaintiffs.
v.

:

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR LUNDBERG DEFENDANTS

:
:

J. SCOTT LUNDBERG. LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a Professional Corporation.
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation. BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE
SERVICES. LTD . a Utah Limited
PaTnersh'-p. <~"ANYON ANDERSON.
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 10,
Defendants

:
:
:
•

CIMI

"

Hon. Leslie A. Lewis

No 020901052

:

The Motion of the Defendants J Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates for partial
summary judgment on Plaintiffs" First. Second, Third and Founh Causes of Action of their
Complaint came on regular!} for heanng before the Honorable Leslie A Lewis on the 22nd day of

August, 2002, with Gary A. Weston and Richard M. Hymas of the firm of Nielsen & Senior
appearing on behalf of said Defendants, and Lester A. Perry of the firm of Hoole & King
appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court heard argument on the Motion, and reviewed the
pleadings and memoranda filed by the respective parties. Determining that there are no genuine
issues of fact to be determined by trial, that Plaintiffs have no cause of action against said
Defendants under the First, Second, Third and Founh Causes of Action of Plaintiffs* Complaint,
and that said Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Coun has so ruled in its
Memorandum Decision filed September 30, 2002.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment of Defendants J. Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates is
granted in its entirety and said Defendants are hereby awarded judgment dismissing, with
prejudice, the First. Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action of Plaintiff s Complaint.
DATED this

^O

day of October, 2002.
"OLIRTp
BY THE CO

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM"

!\ -

v
Le*(er A Perry
Hbole & King
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

>"
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE
:
RUSSELL, for themselves and for
all other similarly situated
:
individuals and entities,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

020901052

Plaintiffs,
«

vs*
:

J, SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a Professional
:
Corporation; BACKMAN TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
:
BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE SERVICES,
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership;
CANYON ANDERSON; RODNEY SERVICE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
:
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 18,
2 003, in connection with the following Motions:
Company's

(Rodney's)

Motion

for

Summary

Rodney Services

Judgment;

Defendants

Sackman Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd. and
Canyon

Anderson's

(collectively

referred

to

as

:r.e

Eackman

defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; tr.e L-ndberg
parties' Motion for Judgment en the Remaining Causes c: Action in
Plaintiffs' Complaint and plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class. At
tr.e ccncl-S-cn cf tr.e hearing on the afore^enticr.ee v:::crs, the
Cc^rt tec-: :^e -atter ^nder advisement.

The Court r.= _tg rev; had
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an opportunity to consider the moving and responding memoranda on
these Motions, having reviewed the relevant case law and in light
of the oral argument in this case, rules as stated herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Because the Lundberg parties1 Motion for Summary Judgment,
Rodney's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Backman defendants1
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings overlap in certain respects,
the Court will analyze all three Motions in tandem.

The Lundberg

parties bring their Motion following the Court granting their prior
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs'
first four causes

of action.

As counsel for the Lundberg parties

emphasized during oral argument, the Court's decision to grant
partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' first four causes of
action as to the Lundberg parties has certain ramifications to
Rodney's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

as

it

pertains

to

plaintiff's first four causes of action against it.
counsel

summarized

the

factual

underpinnings

of

the

Although

the

Court's

September 30, 2002, Memorandum Decision, during oral argument, it
is important to underscore certain of these facts herein.
First:, the Court's

initial

decision established

that the

Lundberg parties never served as counsel cr otherwise entered into
a legal or business relationship with the plaintiffs. The Lundberg
oarties did r.ct r.ake ar.v recresentaticns and did net communicate
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with the plaintiffs when their trust deed was executed.

The

Lundberg parties only communicated with the plaintiffs after they
defaulted.

The Court found as a matter of law on agreed facts that

the Lundberg parties did not have a confidential or a contractual
relationship with the plaintiffs and therefore had no fiduciary or
contractual duties (including no common law duties) towards them.

Because the facts surrounding Rodney1s involvement with the
plaintiffs is analogous to the Lundberg parties1 involvement, the
Court's reasoning in its initial Memorandum Decision is equally
applicable

to

Rodney.

In

fact,

Rodney's

connection

to

the

plaintiffs is even more tenuous because while Mr. Lundberg may have
held the distinction of being a trustee under the plaintiffs' Trust
Deed, Rodney's sole connection to the plaintiffs was posting and
publishing of the Third Notice of Trustee's Sale in connection with
the third foreclosure of the plaintiffs' Trust Deed.
responsibility m

Rodney's

posting and publishing the plaintiffs' Notice

carries with it no implied fiduciary or contractual cities or even
the type of statutory obligations that trie Cc^rt found v.ere imposed
on Mr. Lundberg.

Therefore, tne Court grants summary 3^dement to

Rodney en the plaintiffs' first four causes cf acticn.
The plaintiffs' renaming claims as tc the Lur.cterg parties,
Rodney and the Eackman defendants, wnicn are addressed

m

the
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various Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, are as follows: (5 l,

2

) Restitution Based on Mistake of

Fact, (6) Restitution Based on Mistake of Law; (7) Tortious Payment
of Money3;

(8) Unjust Enrichment; (9) Wrongful Collection; (10)

Liability for Intended Consequences; (11) Actionable Fraud; (12)
Negligent

Misrepresentation;

(13) Civil

Conspiracy;

(14) Utah

Unfair Practices Act; (15) Punitive Damages.
The Court begins

in reverse by ruling that there

independent cause of action for punitive damages.
plaintiffs1

is no

Therefore, the

Fifteenth Cause of Action for punitive damages is

procedurally inappropriate.

In addition, an assessment of the

conduct alleged indicates that the plaintiffs cannot prove the
degree of culpability and egregiousness necessary to justify an
award of punitive damages.
judgment

Therefore, the Court grants summary

to the Lundberg parties and Rodney on this cause of

action.
The Court next- concludes that the Utah Unfair Practices Act
has no application to the facts of this case.
1

Foremost, the

The number in parenthesis designates the number of the cause of action

2

The Court previously granted the Backman defendants' Motion to Dismiss the plaintiffs'
Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth Causes of Action
3

The Seventh. Ninth, Tenth. Eleventh and Twelfth Causes of Action were addressed only
in the Lundberg parties and Rodneys Motion for Summary Judgment
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are not competitors of

the various defendants and

lack

standing

to

assert

the

UPA.

Moreover,

the

plaintiffs have not asserted facts from which this Court could find
the defendants1 practices had the effect of injuring or

that

destroying

competition.

As

counsel

pointed

out

during

oral

argument, the UPA contemplates sales at less than cost to achieve
a monopoly and destroy competition.

The plaintiffs claim that the

defendants charged more than the actual cost.
any applicability of the UPA.

This claim belies

Therefore, the Court grants the

defendants1 Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion for Judgment on
Pleadings on the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Cause of Action.
The Court grants the Lundberg parties' and Rodney's Motions
for Summary Judgment as they pertain to the plaintiffs' Seventh,
Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action.

The Court agrees chat these

causes of action have nc foundation in Utah law.
extent

that

these

are

claims

sounding

in

However, to the

tort,

the

Court's

decisions concerning the lack of duty are dispositive to these
claims.
are

(The Court reiterates that the few procedural duties that

statutory

and which could be

protection of trusters

construed

as being

for the

:r.e plaintiffs) were complied with m

this

case] .
The plaintiffs' renaming claims as tc the Lur.dcerg parties
and Rodney all center en zr.e premise that these defendants inflated
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certain costs stemming from the plaintiffs1 foreclosure in a manner
that ran afoul of Utah Code Annotated §§57-1-29 and 31,- which
limits costs that can be charged in a foreclosure to the actual
costs incurred.

Based on this premise, the plaintiffs assert a

variety of claims, including (1) mistake of law and fact (because
they did not know that the costs were allegedly inflated) ; (2)
fraud

and

negligent

misrepresentation

(based

on

alleged

misrepresentations that the amounts billed to the lender were the
amounts actually incurred); (3) that the various defendants engaged
in a conspiracy to inflate actual costs and (4) that the defendants
were unjustly enriched as a result of the inflated costs.
The plaintiffs concede that the foregoing claims would be
vitiated if the Court finds that the Lundberg parties did not
violate the law when they (1) charged the original cost of a Trust
Deed Sale Guarantee
subsequently

received

(TSG) without deducting a commission they
from Backman-Stewart4 and

(2) when they

delegated the responsibility of publishing and poscing to Rodney
and passed along the cose of Rodney's administrative fee on these

4

The Lundberg parties have provided an Affidavit attesting that these commissions
stemmed from an ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and due to the large volume of business
that the Lundberg parties' provided to Backman-Stewart It undisputed that the amount charged
by the Lundberg parties for the TSGs reflects the amount they actually paid for them
importantly, the plaintiffs have not disputed that there was no set commission paid for each TSG
purchased
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To be clear, the plaintiffs allege that these practices
in

their

lender

(and

in

turn

them)

being

charged

foreclosure costs that were inflated and which did not reflect
"actual costs."
Before launching into the analysis of whether the Lundberg
parties1 practices are lawful, the Court notes that all of the
parties agreed during oral argument that there are no factual
disputes

concerning what

these practices are, only the legal

significance of the same.
The

Court

begins

publication by Rodney.

by analyzing

the costs of posting

and

It is significant that while the plaintiffs

suggest that the Lundberg parties did not need to delegate the
responsibility of posting and publication to Rodney, they have not
cited the Court to any legal authority that a trustee is precluded
from engaging a third-party to perform some of the work necessary
for a non-judicial foreclosure.

In fact, the Court's own legal

research has not yielded any such legal authority perhaps because
there is no legal basis to require a trustee to single-handedly
perform all of the cities accompanying a foreclosure.
Further,
related cc the

it

is ar. economic

reality that there are costs

er.cacerer.: cf a third-party to perfcrT ser/ices.

There has beer, no assertions that Rodney is a charitable endeavor
forT-ed tc provide grai,.i::ous posting and publicancr. services.
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Instead, Rodney is a business and is clearly allowed to make a
profit on its transactions.

The only issue that the Court can

perceive in terms of profit is whether the administrative fee being
charged by Rodney is reasonable, particularly given the tangential
business relationship between Rodney and the Lundberg parties.
However, the plaintiffs have not raised this issue and, in fact, do
not contest

the reasonableness of Rodney's fee.

The Court's

understanding of the plaintiffs1 position is that they only contest
the assessment of the administrative fee in the first place and the
fact that the fee was passed along to the lender (and in turn to
them).
Because the plaintiffs cannot provide the legal basis to
preclude

a

trustee's

delegation

of

responsibilities

and

the

inevitable increase in costs resulting therefrom", their argument
as to the propriety of the fee being passed along must fail as a
matter of law.

As the Lundberg parties point out, their actual

cost for Rodney's posting services, for instance, was $65.00 (which
included the $30.00 administrative fee) . This actual cost was then
charged to the lender ar.c was the amount that the plaintiffs were
required to pay the lender c: reinstate their lean.

Because the

The plaintiffs also do not dispute that there is no legal authorit\ requinng the trustee to
handle the foreclosure at the lowest cost possible, only at a reasonable cost

RUSSELL V. LUNDBERG

PAGE 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

$65.00 was the "actual cost" borne by the Lundberg parties, the
plaintiffs cannot claim that the Lundberg parties or Rodneyfs
practices in regards to the posting/publication costs are unlawful
or that the costs were "inflated" simply by virtue of Rodney being
retained

to

perform

services

that

the

Lundberg

parties

had

previously performed in-house.
Similarly,

the Court

is not

persuaded

that

the

Lundberg

parties were required to deduct the cost of a potential commission
from the price of the TSG.

It is uncontroverted

commissions were not predetermined.

that these

Rather, the commissions were

assessed periodically and had no correlation to a specific TSG.
Overall,

the

Court

is

satisfied

that

the

plaintiffs

have

demonstrated no legal entitlement to a discount as a result of the
Lundberg parties1 possibly garnering a commission for the volume of
business they provide to Backman-Stewart.

The fact remains that

the plaintiffs paid the "actual cost" of the TSG, a cost they would
have had to pay if an entity other than the Lundberc parties had
been involved.
Based on che foregoing, the Court determines thai neither the
Lundberg parties nor Rodney inflated or padded the "actual costs"
chat were charged to the plaintiffs1 lender and which the lender in
turn charged to the plaintiffs.

These defendants' practices were

lawful and do not orovice a basis for recovery under the causes of
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Accordingly,

the Court

grants

the

Lundberg parties1 Motion for Summary Judgment, grants Rodneyfs
Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

and

grants

the

Backman-Stewart

defendants1 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Since this

ruling results in the majority, if not all6, of the plaintiffs'
claims being disposed of, the Court is satisfied that there is no
need or legal basis for granting the plaintiffs1 Motion for Class
Certification.

Accordingly, the Motion for Class Certification is

denied.

6

Since the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings only addressed the Fourteenth Cause of
Action and the Court's prior dismissal dealt with three other causes of action, it appears that a
feu of the plaintiffs' claims against the Backman-Stewart defendants may remain acn\e
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this |M
August, 2003:

Lester A. Perry
Attorney for Plaintiff
4276 S. Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
84124
R. Willis Orton
Daniel J. McDonald
Jason W. Beutler
Attorneys for Defendants Backman Title,
Backman-Stewart Title, and Canyon Anderson
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0120
Gary A, Weston
Richard M. Hymas
Attorneys for Defendants Lundberg
and Lundberg & Associates
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Sale Lake City, Utah
84111

day of

Gary A. Weston USB No. 3435
Richard M. Hymas USB No. 1612
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1900
Facsimile: (801)532-1913
Attorneys for Defendants
J. Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 8 2003
S
By.

H ^ CDeputy
T ^ Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JAMES R RUSSELL and RAYLENE
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other
similarly situated individuals and entities,
Plaintiffs,

J. SCOTT LUNDBERG, LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a Professional
Corporation, BACKMAN TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE
SERVICES, LTD., a Utah Limited
Partnership, CANYON ANDERSON,
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through
10,

ORDER GRANTING THE
LUNDBERG PARTIES' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE REMAINING CAUSES
OF ACTION IN PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT, GRANTING RODNEY
SERVICE CO.'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
GRANTING THE BACKMAN
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS,
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS

Civil No. 020901052
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment on the Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs'
Complaint filed by Defendants J. Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates ("the I.undbcrt
Panics"], the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Rodney Senices Co. [""Rodney""], the

vr-.J5".(,

11 <>)• i « i

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Backman Title Co., Backman-Stewart Title
Services, Ltd., and Canyon Anderson ['the Backman Defendants"], and the Motion to Certify
Class filed by Plaintiffs came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on
June 18, 2003. Lester A. Perry of the firm of Hoole & King appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs,
Gary A. Weston and Richard M. Hymas of the firm of Nielsen & Senior appeared on behalf of
the Lundberg Parties and Rodney, and R. Willis Orton of the firm of Kirton & McConkie
appeared on behalf of the Backman Defendants.
The Court heard arguments on the motions, and reviewed the memoranda, affidavits and
exhibits filed by the respective parties in support of, and in opposition to, the motions. Having
duly considered the matter, the Court has determined and ruled in its Memorandum Decision
filed August 14, 2003, that there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the causes
of action against Defendants that are the subject of the dispositive motions before the Court; that
Plaintiffs are unable to prevail against Defendants on any of those causes of action and that
Defendants are entitled to judgment on those causes of action as a matter of law, and that, given
the Court's ruling on the dispositive motions, there is no need or legal basis for certifying the
class as requested by Plaintiffs. Based upon the foregoing, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
I.

First Four Causes of Action Against Rodnev. In its Memorandum Decision

dated September 30. 2002, the Court determined that, based upon applicable law and the
undisputed evidence presented in connection with the Lundberg Parties* prior Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, the Lundberg Parties did not have any confidential or contractual
relationship with Plaintiffs, and therefore had no fiduciary, contractual or common law duties to

Plaintiffs. The statutory duties that Scott Lundberg owed to Plaintiffs in his capacity as trustee
under Plaintiffs' trust deed (which duties were fully satisfied by Lundberg) did not create on the
part of the Lundberg Parties anyfiduciary,contractual or common law duties to Plaintiffs. As a
result, the Court granted partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs and in favor of the
Lundberg Parties on Plaintiffs' first cause of action for breach offiduciaryduty, second cause of
action for constructive fraud based on breach of fiduciary duty, third cause of action for breach of
contract, and fourth cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The prior ruling by the Court provides support with respect to Rodney's Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the first four causes of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint against Rodney.
The undisputed evidence presented in connection with Rodney's motion established that at no
time did Rodney do business with Plaintiffs, make any representations to or have any
communications with Plaintiffs, otherwise deal with Plaintiffs, or have any confidential or
contractual relationship with Plaintiffs. Based upon that undisputed evidence, the Court has
determined that Rodney had nofiduciary,contractual or common law duties to Plaintiffs as a
matter of law. As a result, Rodney is entitled to judgment against Plaintiffs on the first four
causes of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, and summary judgment in favor of Rodney on those
first four causes of action is hereby granted.
2.

Fifteenth Cause of Action for Punitive Damages Against the Lundberg

Parties and Rodnev. Plaintiffs' fifteenth cause of action against the Lundberg Parties and
Rodney for punitive damages is procedurally defective and inappropriate as there is no
independent cause of action for pumme damages under Utah law In addition, even ifPlaintiffs
were able to pre\ail on an\ of their other causes of action against the Lundberg Parties or
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Rodney, the evidence presented regarding the conduct of those defendants, when viewed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, lacks the degree of culpability and egregiousness necessary to
support or justify an award of punitive damages as a matter of law. Therefore, the Lundberg
Parties and Rodney are entitled to summary judgment on the fifteenth cause of action in
Plaintiffs' Complaint, and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the Lundberg Parties
and Rodney on that cause of action.
3.

Fourteenth Cause of Action for Violations of the Utah Unfair Practices Act

Against Defendants. Plaintiffs1 fourteenth cause of action against Defendants is for alleged
violations of the Utah Unfair Practices Act ["UP A"], but the UP A does not apply in this case.
Plaintiffs are not competitors of any of the Defendants. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not sell
or buy a Trust Deed Sale Guarantee ["TSG"] or other title product or service, and therefore were
not competing sellers or disfavored buyers of the TSGs and other title products and services that
were sold by Backman-Stewart and purchased by the Lundberg Parties. In addition, Plaintiffs
have not alleged, and no evidence has been presented to suggest, that the commissions paid by
Backman-Stewart to the Lundberg Parties or any other practices of the Defendants have damaged
Plaintiffs in any way. Because Plaintiffs ha\ e not suffered any distinct or palpable injury as a
result of the commissions received by the Lundberg Parties from Backman-Stewart. Plaintiffs
lack standing to assert claims under the LTPA against Defendants.
The UPA prohibits an entit} from selling goods or services at less than cost where the
result of such pricing is the establishment of a monopoly or the destruction of competition.
Plaintiffs have presented no facts shoeing that Defendants' practices had the effect of lessening
competition or creating a monopol}
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To the contrary Plaintiffs allege that the amount the
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Lundberg Parties charged the lender or beneficiary under Plaintiffs' trust deed for the TSGs that
they boughtfromBackman Title was more — not less - than the Lundberg Parties were required
to pay for those TSGs. That claim belies the applicability of the UPA to the facts of this case.
Backman-Stewarfs action in paying commissions to the Lundberg Parties in recognition
of Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and for the large amount of business that
the Lundberg Parties' provided to Backman-Stewart does not violate the UPA. Based upon the
undisputed evidence and applicable law, all of the Defendants are entitled to judgment against
Plaintiffs on the fourteenth cause of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, and judgment in favor of
Defendants on that cause of action is hereby granted.
4.

Seventh. Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action for Alleged Tortious Payment of

Mone\\ Wrongful Collection and Liability for Intended Consequences Against the
Lundberg Parties and Rodney. Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action for tortious payment of
money, their ninth cause of action for wrongful collection, and their tenth cause of action for
liability for intended consequences have no foundation in Utah law, and therefore fail to state a
claim against the Lundberg Parties or Rodney upon which relief may be granted. Moreover, even
if these causes of action were recognized under Utah law as legitimate claims sounding in tort,
the Court's determination that the Lundberg Parties and Rodney owed no fiduciary, contractual
or common-law duty to Plaintiffs precludes Plaintiffs from recovering against the Lundberg
Parties and Rodney on these claims as a matter of law.
Based upon the undisputed evidence and applicable law, the Lundberg Parties and
Rodney are entitled to, and are hereby granted, summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the
seventh, ninth and tenth causes of action m Plaintiffs' Complaint.
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5.

Fifth. Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Causes of Action

Against the Lundberg Parties and Rodney, Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action for restitution
based on mistake of fact, their sixth cause of action for restitution based on mistake of law, their
eighth cause of action for unjust enrichment, their eleventh cause of action for fraud, their twelfth
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, and their thirteenth cause of action for civil
conspiracy are all based on the premise that the Lundberg Parties and Rodney inflated certain
costs stemming from the foreclosure of Plaintiffs' trust deed in a manner that ran afoul of Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-29 and § 57-1-31, which limits costs that can be charged in a foreclosure to the
actual costs incurred. Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to restitution based on mistake of fact
and mistake of law because they did not know that the costs were allegedly inflated; that the
Lundberg Parties and Rodney were unjustly enriched as a result of the receipt by them of the
alleged inflated costs; that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation based on alleged misrepresentations that the amounts billed to the lender were
the amounts actually incurred; and that the Lundberg Parties and Rodney engaged in a conspiracy
to inflate the actual costs.
Plaintiffs concede that the foregoing claims would be vitiated if the Court finds that the
Lundberg Parties did not violate the law when they (1) charged the original cost of a TSG
without deducting a commission the\ subsequently received from Backman-Stewart and (2)
when they delegated the responsibilit) of publishing and posting to Rodne> and passed along to
the lender the cost of Rodne\ *s administrative fee and other charges for pro\ iding these services
The Court is not aware of an\ legal authority that proudes that a trustee is precluded from
engaging a third-party to perform some of the work necessary for a non-judicial foreclosure.

-6-

Indeed, the law does not require a trustee to single-handedly perform all of the duties associated
with such a foreclosure. There also is no legal requirement that a trustee handle a foreclosure at
the lowest cost possible. Such costs simply must be reasonable. Accordingly, based upon the
undisputed evidence presented, there was nothing unlawful in the Lundberg Parties's action in
hiring Rodney to perform posting and publication services for it, and in paying Rodney for its
services. There also is nothing unlawful in Rodney making a profit on the services that it
provides. Plaintiffs have not argued, and have not presented any evidence to suggest, that the
administrative fee and other amounts charged by Rodney for its services, and paid by the
Lundberg Parties, were unreasonable.
Because the Plaintiffs cannot provide any legal basis for precluding a trustee's delegation
of responsibilities associated with a non-judicial foreclosure and incurring the reasonable costs
resulting therefrom, their argument as to the propriety of the fee being passed along to the lender
and then to Plaintiffs fails as a matter of law. It is undisputed that the actual cost for Rodney's
posting services was $65.00, which included a $30.00 administrative fee. It similarly is
undisputed that the actual cost to the Lundberg Parties for Rodney's publication services was
S 143.40, the same amount paid by Rodney to the newspaper that published the notices, and that
Rodney received a commission of S30.00 from the newspaper, making it unnecessary for Rodney
to charge the Lundberg Parties any additional administrative fee for its services. The exact
amount of these actual costs paid by the Lundberg Parties was charged to the lender, which was
the same amount that Plaintiffs were required to pay to the lender to reinstate their loan. Because
the amount paid by Plaintiffs for these ''actual costs1' was the same amount paid by the Lundberg
Parties, as well as by the lender. Plaintiffs cannot claim that the practices of the Lundberg Parties
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and Rodney with respect to the posting and publication services were unlawful These costs were
not "inflated" simply because Rodney was retained to perform services that the Lundberg Parties
previously had performed in-house.
Similarly, the Lundberg Parties were not required to deduct the cost of a potential
commission that they might later receive from Backman-Stewart from the price that they paid for
the TSGs in determining the amount that would be billed to the lender for the TSGs. The
commissions paid by Backman-Stewart were not predetermined, were paid periodically, and had
no direct correlation to a specific TSG. Plaintiffs were not entitled to a discount on the amount
that they were required to pay to the lender for the TSGs purchased by the Lundberg Parties in
connection with the foreclosure of their trust deed because of the possibility that the Lundberg
Parties might receive a commission in the future based on the large volume of business that they
provided to Backman-Stewart and Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart.
It is undisputed that the amounts paid by Plaintiffs to reimburse the lender for the actual
cost of the TSGs was the same amount that they would have been required to pay if any other
person or entity serving as trustee had purchased the TSGs in connection with the foreclosure of
Plaintiffs' trust deed.
Based on the undisputed facts before the Court and applicable law, the Court determines
that neither the Lundberg Parties nor Rodney inflated or padded the ''actual costs'' that were
charged to the Plaintiffs' lender and which the lender m turn charged to Plaintiffs Accordingly,
the practices of the Lundberg Parties and Rodney that have been challenged by Plaintiffs in this
action were law ful, and provide no basis for recovery under Plaintiffs' claims for mistake of fact,
mistake of law. unjust enrichment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or ci\ ll conspiracy
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Moreover, because Plaintiffs did not confer a benefit on Rodney, there is no legal basis
for their claims against Rodney for restitution based on mistake of fact or mistake of law or for
unjust enrichment. In addition, because Rodney made no representations to Plaintiffs of any
kind, Plaintiffs may not prevail against Rodney on their claims for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Lundberg Parties and Rodney are entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law on the fifth, sixth, eighth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth causes of
action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the
Lundberg Parties and Rodney on those causes of action.
6.

Motion for Class Certification. The Court's action in granting the Lundberg

Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Remaining Claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint,
Rodney's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Backman Parties' Motion for Judgment of the
Pleadings effectively disposes of all of the causes of action against the Lundberg Parties and
Rodney and most of the causes of action against the Backman Parties. As a result, there is no
need or legal basis for granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Accordingly, the
Motion for Class Certification is hereby denied.
DATED this J$

«day of September, 2003.
BY THE^OURT:

^
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HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS
DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1/

I hereby certify that on this

day of April, 2003,1 served upon all parties the

foregoing ORDER GRANTING THE LUNDBERG PARTIES' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION IN
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, GRANTING RODNEY SERVICE CO.'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING THE BACKMAN DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
CERTIFY CLASS by causing a true and correct copy thereof to be mailed via first-class United
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Lester A. Perry
Hoole & King, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-2634
R. Willis Orton
Kirton & McConkie
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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R. Willis Orton (2484)
ORTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

O C T ' 1 2003

Attorneys for Defendants Backman Title
Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd.
and Canyon Anderson

By

*m$mr

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other
similarly situated individuals and entities;
Plaintiffs,
vs.

J. SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a Professional Corporation;
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; BACKMAN-STEWART
TITLE SERVICES, LTD., a Utah Limited
Partnership; CANYON ANDERSON.
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; and JOHN DOES 1 through
10.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
BACKMAN STEWART
DEFENDANTS ON REMAINING
CLAIMS
Civil No. 020901052
Judge Leslie A. Leu is

Defendants

On September 3, 2003. Defendants Backman Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title
Services, Ltd. and Canyon Anderson (collectively the "Backman Stewart Defendants"), by and

through their attorneys of record, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Remaining
Claims with supporting memorandum. On September 9, 2003, Plaintiffs, through their counsel,
submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to the Backman Stewart Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, in which they admit that "[bjased on the Court's memorandum decision of
August 14,2003, the plaintiffs cannot defend against the motion of the Backman Stewart
Defendants." Backman Stewart Defendants then filed a Notice to Submit the matter for decision.
Therefore, for good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT defendants Backman Title Company, BackmanStewart Title Services, Ltd., and Canyon Anderson are entitled to, and are hereby granted,
summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the Eighth and Fifteenth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs'
Complaint and those claims are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this Is day of September, 2003.

Cp u
Leslie A. Lewis
District Court Judge
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Approved as to form:

By
Lester A. Perry
Attorneys for^l^tiffe
R. Willis Orton
Attorneys for the Backman Stewart Defendants

-3-

Approved as to form

By
Lesue/A. Perry
Attorneys forP^intiffe

Bv

HMi$&-

R. Willis Orton
Attorneys for the Backman Stewart Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE BACKMAN STEWART
DEFENDANTS ON REMAINING CLAIMS.to be mailed, postage prepaid, this / ] _ ^ day of
September, 2003, to:

Lester A. Perry
Hoole & King, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124-2634
Gary A. Weston
Richard M. Hymas
Nielsen & Senior
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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R. Willis Orton (2484)
ORTON&McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV " 4 2003
Attorneys for Defendants Backman Title
Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd
and Canyon Anderson

COUNTY

SALT
6y

#

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other
similarly situated individuals and entities;

vs.

:
:
:
:

J. SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a Professional Corporation;
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; BACKMAN-STEWART
TITLE SERVICES, LTD., a Utah Limited
Partnership; CANYON ANDERSON;
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; and JOHN DOES 1 through
10,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Defendants.

:

Plaintiffs,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE
Civil No. 020901052
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Based on the accompanying Stipulation for Order of Dismissal, good cause appaering
therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth Causes of Action
of the Complaint as against defendants Backman Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title
Services, Ltd. and Canyon Anderson are dismissed with prejudice, each of the parties to bear
their own costs.
DATED this j££ day of October, 2003.
BY THE COURT:
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By_
Leslie A. Lewis
LewiJudge
District Court

Approved as to form:

By A

"fuZiA
-/ ^ /y

Lerfer A. Perry
Attprneys for Pontiffs

f\

K/C^-

By_
R. Willis Orton
Attorneys for Defendants Backman
Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title
Services, Ltd. and Canyon Anderson
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